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ARTICLES
The Professional and the Liar*
BY RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD"
INTRODUCTION
MEPHISTO:
Sancta simplicitas!
Who ever thought of that?
Just testify,
and hang whether it's true!'
"[N]o fact is too patent to be demed.' 2
Lawyers m criminal cases, for prosecution
and defense, sometimes swim m a sea of lies 3
CONFIDENTIALITYnoun. An obligation
not to disclose the TRUTH.4
* Copyright © 1999. Prepared for discussion at the WorldWide Advocacy
Conference 1998, Inns of Court School of Law, London, June 29-July 2, 1998.
** Spears-Gilbert Professor of Law, Umversity of Kentucky. B.S. 1969, J.D.
1976, Ohio State University. Co-author, WILLIAM T. FORTUNE, RICHARD H.
UNDERWOOD & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, MODERN LITIGATION AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY HANDBOOK (1996), and the earlier RICHARD H.
UNDERWOOD & WILLIAM T. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS (1988); Editor of the
Kentucky Ethics Opinions and Professional Responsibility Deskbook (UK/CLE);
Former Chairman, Ethics and Unauthorized Practice Committees, Kentucky Bar
Association.
'GOETHE'S FAUST 293 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Anchor Books, Doubleday
1961).
2 ARTHUR TRAIN, THE CONFESSIONS OF ARTEMAS QUIBBLE 83 (Charles
Scribner's Sons 1924).
3 United States v. Zuno-Arce, 44 F.3d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1995) (arising from
the murder of DEA Agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar).
4 PATRICK SCRiVENOR, EGG ON YOUR INTERFACE: A DICTIONARY OF MODERN
NONSENSE 53 (1989).
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g epsto, Old Scratch-the Devil by any other name-has been
i associated with lawyers since "the beginning." Here is
ritan's poet Coleridge's offering on the subject:
[The Devil] saw a Lawyer killing a Viper
On a dung heap beside his stable,
And the Devil smiled, for it put him in mmind
Of Cam and his brother, Abel.
Since I am an American lawyer, my natural reaction is to counter with
a fallacious argument, ad hommnem.6 Coleridge was a drug addict, and he
was not very good about footnoting his sources either.7 Take that!
Coleridge's poem may be among the nastiest of lawyer put-downs, but
there are always new contenders. James Halpern, a first-time novelist and
full-time corn collector, just published a novel titled The Truth Machine.'
As the story unfolds, software prodigy Randall Armstrong comes up with
the ultimate lie detector-a truth machine that actually works! Good news?
Not at all. The author takes great pleasure m announcing, as early as the
jacket cover, that "[miost lawyers find themselves loolang for new,
productive jobs."9
Another recent shot at lawyers came from an unlikely quarter-the
"science" of archeology A team of would-be Indiana Joneses working m
Iraq (prior to the invasion of Kuwait and the Gulf War) claim to have
found the biblical Sodom in the scorched rams of a place called
Mashkan-shapir. The city appears to have been an administrative and
judicial center. The theory is that it was destroyed around 1900 B.C.
when migrating underground oil and gas erupted from the earth and was
ignited by cooking fires, creating a pillar offire-a favorite Biblical
attention grabber. Our earth-moving lawyer-bashers contend that this
headquarters of the "Babyloman supreme court" was also the center of a
5 SAMUELTAYLORCOLERIDGE, TheDevil's Thoughts, in THEPOETICALWORKS
OF SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE 147 (James D. Campbell ed., 1924). As for
Mephisto, it is notable that the Greek word for devil-diabolos-also means
"slanderer." IV OxFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 569 (2d ed. 1989).
6 See generally Richard H. Underwood, Logic and the Common Law Trial, 18
AM. J. TRIALADVOC. 151 (1994).
7 See NORMAN FRUMAN, COLERIDGE, THE DAMAGED ARCHANGEL 38-42, 49
(1971); THOMAS MALLON, STOLEN WORDS: FORAYS INTO THE ORIGINS AND
RAVAGES OF PLAGIARSIM (1989).
8 JAMES L. HALPERIN, THE TRUTH MACHINE (1996).
9 Id. at dust jacket (emphasis added).
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sort of Mephistophelian cult. Its citizens worshipped a sickle-carrymg
Satan prototype named Nergal. ° Referring to the destruction of the place,
our critics quote Genesis: "Then Abraham fell upon his face and
laughed."1' This quotation is wrenched way out of its original context,
which makes one wonder about the whole Nergal-Sodom thing. You just
cannot trust archaeologists. They are notoriously ideological and hardly
more reliable than lotus-eating poets.
Still, archaeologists and poets are not the only people who think that
all lawyers are liars. Some think lawyers are allowedto lie. 2 Regrettably,
some American lawyers apparently think so too.
Is that right? For example, may a lawyer knowingly elicit false
testimony9 Suppose that a lawyer's client lies to the fact-finder, whether
judge or jury Assume that the lawyer was taken by surprise by the
falsehoods of the client (perhaps the testimony was volunteered, given
other than in response to the lawyer's questions, or even given contrary to
the lawyer's mstructions or warnings). May the lawyer use the false
testimony to make the best case for the client? Must a lawyer ever disclose
the truth to correct the client's perjury9 Sissela Bok, a certified moral
philosopher, shares and has expressed the public's doubt that such
questions ever cross the minds of lawyers, or if they do, that the organized
bar has ever taken any coherent position as to the correct answers. Being
an academic, she is not without citations of authority-
[O]ne recent textbook on the professional responsibility of lawyers holds
merely-
'
0Nergal was the god of the underworld m ancient Mesopotaman theology. See
CHARLES PELLEGRINO, RETuRN TO SODOM AND GOMORRAH: BIBLE STORIES FROM
ARCHAEOLOGISTS 152 (1994). Nergal appeared m the epic poem recounting the
deeds of Gilgainesh. See DAVID FERRY, GILGAMESH: A NEW RENDERING IN
ENGLISH 70 (1992).
"PELLEGRINO, supra note 10, at 177 (quoting Genesis 17:17).
'
2 The profession has begun to react to these criticisms. Explanation is being
replaced by expiation. For some recent offerings, see generally W Ted Minick,
Fixing the Truth, in LENDER LIABILITY AND OTHER COMPLEX LITIGATION
INVOLVING FINANCIAL INSTrrUTIoNS 509 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study 1994);
Bruce Green, "The Whole Truth?"" How Rules of Evidence Make Lawyers
Deceitful, 25 LOY. L.A. L. REV 699 (1992); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary
Excesses intheAmerican Criminal Trial, 67NOTREDAMEL. REV 403 (1992); and
R.J. Gerber, Victory vs. Truth: The Adversary System and its Ethics, 19 ARIZ. ST.
L.. 3 (1987).
1998-99]
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"There is simply no consensus, for example, as to the lawyer's duty
to the court ifhe knows his client is lying. In that and other situations
a lawyer can only be sensitive to the issues involved and resolve
these difficult cases as responsibly as he or she is able."
Closer to throwing up one's hands one cannot get. To leave such choice
open to the sensitive and the responsible without giving them criteria for
choice is to leave it open as well to the insensitive and the corrupt. 13
In fairness, it ought to be said that the author Bok quoted was not
stating his preference. He was, m a way, simply making the same
observation that Bok was making-that m the United States there has been,
and continues to be, a troubling lack of professional consensus when it
comes to actual cases. 4 Indeed, lawyers who are neither corrupt nor
insensitive have been accused by Bok of arguing that the elicitation of false
testimony, and the use of it, is aprofessional responsibility. 5 Fainess also
calls for some acknowledgment that even the most cunning, zealous, and
successful of trial lawyers have agonized over such moral choices. For
example, Adela Rogers St. Johns recounts several such struggles in her
powerful biography of her father, Earl Rogers.
[Rogers, in defense of a man who "because he was stuck on another
woman shot his wife in cold blood,"] argued, "Mootry loved his wife. He
did not kill her. Martha, sitting there with her Bible-could any man no
matter how low he had fallen slay his wife, as she sat in their home with
her Bible open m her hands? Can you [members of the jury] believe any
'3 SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 162
(1978) (quoting THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (1976)).
4 Because the 50 state bar associations are not bound to adhere to the current
views of an ABA drafting committee, this is still true. Cf Karen L. K. Miller, Zip
To Nil?" A Comparison of American and English Lawyers' Standards of
Professional Conduct, in CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 199, 221 (A.L.I.-A.B.A. Course of Study, 1995) ("The Model
Rules, the public and the legal community have not agreed [on] how to
reconcile these 'trilemmas,' allowing and leaving lawyers to sort out their own
personal answers.").
's See BOK, supra note 13, at 159. This is Bok's characterization of such
professional commentators as Monroe Freedman, see MONROE FREEDMAN,
LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 27-42 (1975), and Charles Curtis,
see Charles P Curtis, The Ethics ofAdvocacy, 4 STANFORD L. REV. 3 (1951). This,
too, strikes me as an unfair characterization, for reasons that shall be set out shortly.
[VOL. 87
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man would dare to do that? Wouldn't he expect a bolt from heaven to
strike him down?"
"No. Martha was growing stone deaf. She was m ill health that made
her days a misery. She saw long years of pain and illness ahead of her in
a world where she could hear no sound. So she dared to take her own life
rather than be a burden on her husband." The jury found Mootry not
guilty.
[Reverend Rogers, the lawyer's father,] watched Mootry, free,
homdly trumphant, simper up with outstretched hand to thank the man
who had procured an acquittal. "Get away from me you slimy pinp," Earl
Rogers said in disgust, "you're guilty as hell."
My grandfather walked out quietly. That mght he sent for [Earl and]
said, "There is a line as clear and broad to an honest man as the line
between good and evil or right and wrong always is. You must draw that
line Earl. The proper defense which is the right of every American citizen
high or low in our republic. These words a proper defense constitute a
line of sacred truth. An attempt to save a man you know to be guilty from
justice by dishonest or deceptive means crosses that line. You see that?"
"The debate on this has been going on for centuries between the best
minds in the legal profession," Earl said. "As I see it, it is my business to
defend everybody."
"Very well, very well!" his father said, and got up and came over and
patted his shoulder again, emphasizing Ins words. "Defend everybody. I
agree to that. But with honor. If you use your talent, your power, to take
one step over that line you are one with the criminal." "Earl," he said
solemnly, "you can never lie in word, thought, or deed to save a man from
justice. It would have been better for you if this man Mootry had been
found guilty as you knew him to be."16
Skeptics and cymes may dismiss ReverendRogers's advice, but his son
did not, and Earl Rogers was one of the greatest trial lawyers of American
history There are, m fact, rules of professional ethics relating to the use
of false evidence. We do not have to rely solely upon the discretion of
the "sensitive and responsible," as it may be supplemented from time
to time by the advice, of the Reverend Rogers of the world. But if there
is some professional consensus or agreed etiquette, what does it amount
to m the application? What do the ethical rules mean on the dueling
grounds?
16 ADELA ROGERS ST. JOHNS, FINAL VERDICT 96-97, 102, 104 (1962).
1998-991
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I. THE PROFESSIONAL AND THE LIAR
A. The Rules of the Game
"You will observe the Rules ofBattle, of course?" the White Knight
remarked, putting on his helmet too.
"I always do," said the Red Knight, and they began banging away at
each other with such fury that Alice got behind a tree to be out of the way
of the blows.
"I wonder, now, what the Rules of Battle are," she said to herself, as
she watched the fight, timidly peeping out from her huding-place. 17
[My father] used to tell us that from his earliest days he had an ambition
to be a lawyer, but his father had told hun that, unless he would forego
this ambition, he would not send hun to school, as all lawyers were liars.18
[R]esolve to be honest at all events. [I]f in your own judgment you
cannot be an honest lawyer, resolve to be honest without being a lawyer. 9
As a lawyer, my agenda has nothing to do with truth andjustice. It has to
do with winning within a certain set of rules.20
17 LEWIS CAROLL, MORE ANNOTATED ALICE: ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN
WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND
THERE 276 (1990).
18 ARTHUR G. POWELL, I CAN Go HOME AGAIN 27 (1943). This is reminiscent
of the joke: "Please don't tell my mother I'm a lawyer. She thinks I play the piano
at the local bordello." Also, my late father-in-law, a retired coal miner, told his
daughter (my wife), "I'd rather you grow beans!" when she announced that she was
quitting her job as a teacher in rural Virginia to go to law school.
19 JOHN FRANK, LINCOLN AS A LAWYER 4 (1961) (quoting Abraham Lincoln,
Notes for a LawLecture (July 1, 1850)). In a Comment appearing in the Nebraska
Law Review, lawyer Andrew Reisman notes that Lincoln's contemporaries
occasionally felt that Lincoln was a bit too honest, sometimes at the expense of his
clients. In several cases of note, Lincoln delivered uninspired and ineffective
performances or literally abandoned clients mid-trial if he became convinced that
they were guilty or that they were advancing false clais or defenses. See Andrew
Reisman, Comment, An Essay on the Dilemma of "HonestAbe" The Modern Day
ProfessionalResponsibilitylmplications ofAbraham Lincoln 'sRepresentations of
Clients He Believed to Be Culpable, 72 NEB. L. REV 1205 (1993).
20 Leslie Scanlon, Judge Subpoenas Lawyers to Defend Secret Prozac Deal.
Significant Evidence May Have Been Withheld from Jury, COURIER-JOURNAL
[VOL. 87
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Somehow that last point did not sound quite as bad when Simon
Rifland said essentially the same thing: "[T]he object of a trial is not the
ascertamment of truth but the resolution of a controversy by the principled
application of the rules of the game."'21 Perhaps tins sounds better to me
because I know that Riflknd's position does not rule out the possibility that
winning may be justice and that lawyers may have something to do with
the truth. Lawyers frequently deal with ethical problems arising from the
(Louisville, Ky.), May 7,1995, at IA. This interviewwas published m commentary
on a product liability suit which arose out of a mass murder committed by a
disgruntled, Prozac-takmg employee of Standard Gravure m Louisville, Kentucky
It was reported that the plaintiffs and the defendant, Eli Lilly & Co., had reached
some sort of agreement pursuant to which the plaintiffs would be paid an
unreported and presumably significant sum of money. In exchange, the plaintiffs
would not put into evidence certain facts regarding the safety of another drug,
Oraflex, and would not appeal any jury verdict in the case. The jury did not see the
controversial evidence and rendered a verdict for the defendant. See id. The
plaintiffs and the defendant probably felt thatthe secretpartial settlementwas good
"insurance" for both sides. Apparently, the withheld evidence had something to do
with the fact that Oraflex (an anti-arthritis drug) had been pulled from the market
by Eli Lilly after a number of patients died after using it. Eli Lilly pled guilty to 25
misdemeanor counts for failing to report evidence of adverse reactions to the Food
and Drug Admimstration. See id. Why had the trial judge previously decided that
the Oraflex evidence was relevant? A good case could have been made, and
presumably was made, for its exclusion, but just before trial the judge ruled that he
was going to let the evidence m. Given the highly charged and prejudicial effect
that such evidence probably would have had, was this a case of evidentiary
"greymail"? What do we now know about the safety of Prozac or Oraflex? Eli Lilly
must have thought it was getting a fair shot at the vindication ofProzac-fair m the
sense that it would not have to deal with the distraction of irrelevant evidence about
Oraflex. What did Eli Lilly ultimately gain from the deal now that the secret is out?
Nothing but headaches. One of the last newspaper articles I saw on the case
reported that both Eli Lilly and plaintiffs' counsel are being sued for having
"perpetrated a fraud on the Kentucky trial court and the public." Leslie Scanlon,
Malpractice, Fraud, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Sept. 2, 1995, at lB.
Meanwhile, the Kentucky Supreme Court issued an opinion authorizing the trial
judge to get to the bottom of things. See Potter v. Eli Lilly and Co., 926 S.W.2d
449 (Ky. 1996). For a scathing rebuke of the lawyers in the case, see Marianne M.
Jennings, The Model Rules and the Code of Professional Responsibility Have
Absolutely Nothing to Do with Ethics: The Wally Cleaver Proposition as an
Alternative, 1996 WIS. L. REV 1223, 1229-34 (1996).
2 Simon Rifkmd, The Lawyer's Role andResponsibility in Modern Society, 30
THE RECORD 534 (1975), reprinted inpart in STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF
LAWYERS, PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 294, 297 (1992).
1998-99]
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truth value of evidence m the course of resolving controversies. The
problem is that truth is not the only value. For the advocate, loyalty and
confidentiality also figure into the equation, as do important systemic,
political, and historical considerations.' When these values come into
conflict, how are we to strike the proper balance? Critics of the adversarial
system suggest that it "places too low a value on truth telling; that we have
allowed ourselves too often to sacrifice truth to other values that are
inferior, or even illusory 3 The defenders of the professional faith
sometimes lean nearly as far the other way
The question of limits-the question of what is and is not a '!proper
defense," to use Reverend Rogers's terminology-was put squarely before
the public in a particularly bloody murder case. The crime was pretty
terrifying. The victim's throat has been cut from earto ear. Surely the killer
must have been covered with blood, and surely he or she must have left an
obvious trail. And as it turned out, the cops did focus on a suspect quite
early on. They suspected someone who was close to the victim, although
he was disappointingly clean. No blood on this fellow The press had been
hard on the police of late due to recent failures, so the police were keen on
public relations. They leaked each and every find in order to reassure the
terrified public and point out that they were on top ofthings after all. Each
leak fueled the fires of sensationalism, and witnesses were deluged by
publicity, some unwanted and some sought after. The public was sure that
the man m custody must be guilty
-Still, the evidence was circumstantial. There was not a single eyewit-
ness to the actual cutting, and the murder weapon could not be found. A
bloody glove, and later some blood-spotted items of clothing, turned up in
places that were under the control of the alleged murderer. But these very
places had been searched previously by zealous detectives! The defense
naturally suggested that a police conspiracy was afoot. The evidence must
have been planted. These belated discoveries were just too convenient.
Everyone knows that no self-respecting cutthroat would screw up this way!
Moreover, witnesses to the suspect's demeanor before and after the crime
disagreed. He acted guilty He did not act guilty He seemed to be sleeping
well after the murder, so he could not be guilty Self-appointed experts
opmed both ways on all the issues, whether the issues were real or
imagined. Worried prosecutors fretted about the ability ofjurors to convict
' For an excellent and pithy description and justification of the adversarial
system, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ
AND THE LAW ON TRIAL 6-8 (1988).
23 MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 12 (1980).
[VOL. 87
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on circumstantial evidence alone, no matter how strong it was. On the other
hand, if not the accused, then who? No other possibility seemed the least
bit plausible.
No, I am not talking about the murder of Ms. Nicole Brown-Simpson!
The case was Regina v. Courvozsier24 The victim was the seventy-
something Lord Russell. The man who stood in the dock, accused of
slitting Lord Russell's throat, was his valet, Benjamin Frangois
Courvoisier. The case fits into our discussion because after the first day of
trial Courvoisier did a terrible, inexcusable thing. He called for his lawyer,
and In the privacy (in the sanctity?) of the attorney-client confessional, he
confessed. He admitted that he had done the deed! What really annoyed his
defense team was his refusal to plead guilty He demanded a defense, as if
his guilt were a trifling matter. He wanted off. His well-coiffed leading
barrister, the envy of the local bar, Mr. Charles Phillips, was having a bad
hair day Things were going to get much worse for him before getting
better.
Barrister Phillips had no ethics committee to turn to for an advisory
opimoni 5 In the end, he sought advice from an odd source. He asked the
advice of Mr. Baron Parke, who was not the presidingjudge but was sitting
on the case and assisting Lord Chief Justice Tindal. According to reports,
Mr. Baron Parke was quite put out. He rebuked Phillips and his co-counsel
for informing him of the confession. Still, his advice was that Phillips was
obliged to defend the client using "'all fair arguments arising on the
evidence."' 26 Phillips did as he had been advised, vigorously cross-
examined witnesses he knew were giving truthful testimony, suggesting
that one might have been involved with someone other than Courvoisier m
committing the crime (or at least that she had foreknowledge of it), and
attempting to persuade the jury to acquit his client. Phillips told the jury,
"The Omniscient God alone knows who did tis crime."27 Several critics
charged that Phillips had crossed the line. Directly or indirectly, he had
asserted his opinion that his client was innocent, worse yet, knowing that
I Regmav Courvoisier, 173 Eng. Rep. 869 (1840). A wonderful account ofthe
case is provided in DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER (1973).
1 As the Chairman of the Kentucky Bar Association Ethics Committee for 14
years (a "part-time" job), I answered questions like this, truly, at all hours of the
day and night. See Richard H. Underwood, Confessions ofan Ethics Chairman, 16
J. LEGAL PROF 125 (1991) [hereinafter Underwood, Confessions of an Ethics
Chairman].
26 MELLINKOFF, supra note 24, at 140 (quoting Letter from Charles Phillips,
Esq., to Samuel Warren, Esq., Bamster-at-Law, 12 (1892)).27 1d. at 222.
1998-99]
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he was guilty When the public got wind of what had happened, Phillips
was condemned in the court of public opinion, although he received
considerable support from the bar. Had he crossed the line? Nowadays,
might he be charged with violating England's Code of Conduct paragraphs
610(b) and (h)28 andpossibly Annexe H's Standards Applicable to Criminal
Cases paragraphs 3.4 and 3.5929
Before commenting on specific rules against "lying," let me set forth
my assumption that we all agree that the ethics of advocacy permit and
encourage the advocate to defend a "guilty client."
In considering the duty of an advocate retained to defend a person
charged with an offence who confesses to counsel himself that he did
commit the offence charged, it is essential to bear the following points
clearly m mind:-(1) That every punishable crime is a breach of the
common or statute law committed by a person of sound mind and
understanding; (2) that the issue m a criminal trial is always whether the
accused is guilty of the offence charged, never whether he is innocent; (3)
that the burden of proof rests on the prosecution. Upon the clear apprecia-
tion of these points depends broadly the true conception of the duty of the
advocate for the accused.
His duty is to protect his client as far as possible from being
convicted except by a competent tribunal and upon legal evidence
sufficient to support a conviction for the offence with which he is
charged.
The ways m which this duty can be successfully performed with
regard to the facts of a case are (a) by showing that the accused was
irresponsible at the time of the commission of the offence charged by
reason of insanity or want of criminal capacity, or (b) by satisfying the
tribunal that the evidence for the prosecution is unworthy of credence, or,
2 CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES para. 610(b)
(1993), repnnted in Rules of Conductfor Counsel and Judges: A Panel Discusszon
on English andAmerican Practices: Appendix, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 865, 892
(1994) (prohibiting a barrister from asserting a personal opinion as to the facts or
the law); id. para. 610(h) (disallowing a barrister from suggesting that a witness is
guilty of a crime or other bad act unless relevant and supported by reasonable
grounds).
29 Id. Annexe H: Written Standards for the Conduct of Professional Work,
Standards Applicable to Criminal Cases para. 3.4 (dealing with conflicts of
interest); id. para. 3.5 (addressing representation of other parties m later stages of
the same litigation).
[V'OL. 87
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even if believed, is insufficient to justify a conviction for the offence
charged, or (c) by setting up m answer an affirmative case.
If the duty of the advocate is correctly stated above, it follows that the
mere [mere?!] fact that a person charged with a crime has in the circum-
stances above mentioned made such a confession to his counsel, is no bar
to that advocate appearing or continuing to appear in Is defence, nor
indeed does such a confession release the advocate from Ins imperative
duty to do all he honourably can do for his client.
[But regarding limits. .]
But such a confession imposes very strict limitations on the conduct
of the defence. An advocate "may not assert that which he knows to be a
lie. He may not connive at, much less attempt to substantiate, afraud. "
[I]t would be absolutely wrong to suggest that some other person
had committed the offence charged, or to call any evidence, which he
must know to be false having regard to the confession, such, for instance,
as evidence in support of an alibi, which is intended to show that the
accused could not have done or in fact had not done the act; that is to say,
an advocate must not (whether by calling the accused or otherwise) set up
an affirmative case inconsistent with the confession made to hum. 30
Historically, courtroom rules of etiquette have placed considerable
responsibility for preventing the introduction of false testimony on the
shoulders of counsel for the proponent. Banisters from Forsyth to Boulton
have written about the line that counsel may not cross. They sound a lot
like Reverend Rogers.
The principle is as clear as noon-day, that no man ought to do for another
what that other can not, without moral turpitude, do for himself. The
advocate stands before the tribunal to plead the cause and represent the
person of his client utimur enimfictionepersonarum, et velut ore alieno
loquimur, but he cannot possibly by virtue of ns agency acquire rights
greater than are possessed by his principal. He may not assert that which
he knows to be a lie. He may not conmve at, much less attempt to
substantiate a fraud.ii
3 0 WILLIAM BOULTON, A GUIDE TO CONDUCT AND ETIQUETTE AT THE BAR OF
ENGLAND AND WALES 71-72 (Butterworths, 6th ed. 1975) (emphasis added); see
also CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES, Annexe H: Written
Standards for the Conduct of Professional Work, Standards Applicable to Criminal
Cases paras. 3.1-3.6 (1993) (addressing a variety of conflict of interest issues).
31 WILLIAM FORSYTH, THE HISTORY OF LAWYERS:ANCIENTAND MODERN 397-
98 (1875) (citation omitted).
1998-99]
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There are anumber oftheABA's ModelRules ofProfessional Conduct
which deal with lying.
Rule 4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(a) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or
(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure
is necessary to avoid assisting a crimial or fraudulent act by a client,
unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6 [which deals with what
has traditionally been termed lawyer-client confidentiality]) 2
Rule 3.3 Candor toward the Tribunal
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure
is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or frauduletit act by the
client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the control-
ling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to
the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel;
or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer
has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity,
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of
the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6 [that is, candor to the
tribunal trumps lawyer-client confidentiality].
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably
believes is false.33
Rule 3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or
unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material
having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or
assist another person to do any such act;
32 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1 (1998).
33 Id. Rule 3.3.
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(b) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or
offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;
(e) m trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably
believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible
evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts m issue except when
testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness
of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil
litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused 34
Phillips didnotknowmglyofferperjuredtestimony Thatmatteris now
addressed m Model Rule 3.3(a)(4). 5 Model Rule 3.3(a)(4) marks the latest
swing of the ABA pendulum:
[If the lawyer knows that the client has committed perjury, the Model
Rules] require [the] lawyer to first remonstrate with the client and, that
failing, to report the perjury to the court.
With respect to anticipated perjury, the ABA's position has always
been that an attorney cannot actively participate in the presentation of
false evidence.
Under the Model Rules, [the] lawyer must attempt to dissuade
[the] client from testifying falsely; if that fails, [the lawyer] may attempt
to withdraw; and that failing, [the lawyer] must inform the court ifperjury
does occur.3 6
Did we inherit this approach from the British barrister9 One cannot be
sure. Sir William Boulton stated:
Where, during a trial or after the conclusion of a hearing in which
judgement is reserved, counsel is informed by his lay client that he has
committed perjury, counsel is not under any duty to inform the Court of
perjury, and it would be contrary to Ins duty to ns lay client to do so; but
he is under a duty (having regard to his overriding duty not to be a party
4 Id. Rule 3.4. Had the Model Rules been in effect in Phillips' time, I assume
that his critics would have alluded to Model Rule 3.4(e).
" See supra text accompanying note 33.
3 6 WILLIAM FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN LITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILIrY HANDBOOK: THE LiMITs OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY 480-81 (1996)
(footnotes omitted).
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to a fraud on the Court) to decline to take any further part m the case,
unless ins client has given hum authority to inform the Court of the
perjured statement, and he has so informed the CourL37
If I am reading this correctly, it says that counsel should remonstrate with
the client, but reasonable remedial measures do not appear to extend to
blowing the whistle on the client.
Before the adoption of the Model Rules, there were other controversial,
competing approaches to the problem of client perjury In 1966, Professor
Monroe Freedman published a provocative article advocating an "alter
ego" approach. 8 Professor Freedman argued that lawyers should try to
persuade their clients to tell the truth, but if not persuaded, the lying client
should be called to the stand and questioned as any other witness.3 9 When
Freedman's views first appeared, it was predictable that they would be
embraced by criminal defense lawyers. It was just as predictable that they
would be rejected by academics and judges. The pendulum was swinging
in the opposite direction, toward the approach ultimately taken by the ABA
Model Rules. But, by the nud-1990s, it had become fashionable to attack
the establishment, Model Rules view and support Freedman's position.4'
The "Burger Court' ' 2 dicta mNix v. Whiteside43 probably invited much of
the critical law review commentary, which included a somewhat negative
37 BOULTON, supra note 30, at 77; cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 3.3(b).
38 See Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer" The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv 1469 (1966).
This article was expanded into a book. See MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS'
ETHIcs IN AN ADvERARY SYSTEM (1975).
39 See FREEDMAN, supra note 38, at 1477-78.
0 One of the most influential attacks on the Freedman position was made in
Charles W Wolfram, Client PerJury: The Kutak Commission and the Association
of Trial Lawyers on Lawyers, Lying Clients, and the Adversary System, 1980 AM.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 964.
4 For a thorough treatment of "process" justifications for the Freedmaman
view, see Jay Sterling Silver, Truth, Justice, and the American Way: The Case
Against the Client Perjury Rules, 47 VAND. L. REV 339,352-54 (1994). See also
Donald Liskov, Note, Criminal Defendant Perjury: A Lawyer's Choice Between
Ethics, the Constitution, and the Truth, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV 881 (1994).
42 is academic code for "those reactionaries."
43Nix v Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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review by one of the lawyers for the state who won the case!' One "think
piece" even found support for Freedman's position in the history of
Catholic casuistry'45
The third view appeared in the early 1970s, when
an ABA committee suggested that a lawyer might call a willful client to
the stand and sit on the sidelines while the client perjured himself, the
lawyer [asking] no questions and [making] no reference to the testimony
m summation. This proposal for testimony by client narrative was
approved by the ABA Standing Committee on Criminal Justice Standards
m 1971, but was never approved by the House of Delegates and was
withdrawn m 1979.46
This "middle way" is far from ideal, as the following personal anecdote
indicates.
Quite a few years ago, I was a young law clerk working for a United
States District Judge m the Southern District of Ohio m Cincinnati. In that
role, I watched quite a number of federal criminal trials. One that I will
never forget involved a young Afican-American man charged with being
the get-away driver for a not very successful band of bank robbers. As
anyone experienced in crime or familiar with any aspect of the criminal
justice system will tell you, there is no future in robbing banks. The FBI is
still pretty efficient when it comes to catching bank robbers. Bank robbers
tend to be unsophisticated, and their prosecutors are usually able to come
up with a glittering array of incriminating facts, including the footage of at
least one security camera, finger and palm prints, eyewitness testimony,
one or more confessions, and the testimony of at least one "stool pigeon."
But in this case all the prosecutors had was a stool pigeon-the ringleader
or "brains" behind the rather brainless operation-and some rather weak
"See Brent R. Appel, The Limited Impact ofNix v. Whiteside on Attorney-
Client Relations, 136 U. PA. L. REV 1913, 1928-38 (1988).
" See Philip J. Grib, A Lawyer's Ethically Justified "Cooperation" in Client
Perjury, 18 J. LEGAL PROF. 145, 153-64 (1993). Grib focused on the position of
Catholic lawyers on the propriety of representing clients seeking divorces. See also
Richard H. Underwood, Perjury: An Anthology, 13 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 307
(1996) (discussing Jesuit Father Henry Garnet's case).
46 FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 36, at 480-81; see also Norman Lefstem, Client
Perjury in Criminal Cases: Still in Search ofAn Answer, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
521 (1988).
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eyewitness testimony 47 The stool pigeon lacked a certain something. All
gadded up in a bright orange jumpsuit, courtesy of the maximum security
prison that was his home, he informed the jury in rather casual tones that
his occupation was bank robber. The most distinctive aspect of his gang's
modus operandi was a shotgun blast to the nearest wall clock in the bank
to get everyone's attention. This rather menacing individual related how he
and the defendant had planned the caper the night before m a meeting in the
White Castle hamburger joint (Cincmnatians call the White Castle the
"Porcelain Room" because it is all white tile, inside and out) nearest the
bank.
The defendant was represented by court-appointed counsel. But this
was no ordinary court-appointed counsel. This lawyer was a solo practitio-
ner, but he could do anything. He could write a will, he could form a
corporation, and he could try a case with the best of them. And he did a
great job. Everyone was expecting an acquittal, but then a curious thing
happened. Before the defense rested, the lawyer approached the bench with
Ins client. As I huddled with the lawyers at side-bar, I heard the defense
lawyer urge Ins client not to testify, and I thought I heard the Judge urge
the same! The defendant was having none of this. He was going to "tell his
story "
From his place at the podium, the frustrated defense attorney tried to
look sympathetic and said something like, "Tell your story "The defendant
then launched into a rambling explanation that, while it was true that he
had met with the prosecution witness in the White Castle, they were not
planning a bank robbery You see, the defendant "was not into violence."
It was not Ins style. He was a heroin dealer They were planning a big
heroin deal! At this point, a thirty-something mother of three on the jury
glared at the defendant. It seemed to me that her eyes got two or three sizes
bigger. I knew who the foreman of the jury was going to be and that the
verdict was going to be guilty' I was right. The defense lawyer did not refer
to the defendant's testimony in his closing. It was a pretty good closing, but
the verdict was guilty This anecdote does not say much for the narrative
approach, but would the defendant have been any better off if he had
followed the Freedman position?
When counsel fails to use the client's testimony, a clear signal is sent
to the jury This is but one variation of the difficulty that confounded
" The eyewitness testimony was only credible because the defendant had a
distinctive bithmark just above a cheekbone. It was in the shape of afleur-de-lis!
[VOL. 87
HeinOnline  -- 87 Ky. L.J. 934 1998-1999
THE PROFESSIONAL AND THE LIAR
Barrister Phillips m Courvouszerl and that has continued to confound
generations of advocates. We know there must be limits, but how do you
put on the brakes without signaling with telltale brakelights? Consider
Edward Abmger's lament, sung m his autobiography Forty Years at the
Bar, when he faced the somewhat analogous problem of defending a
prisoner who confessedto hn m confidence that he was guilty of the crime
charged:
What was I to do [after the prisoner I was defending admitted to the
forgery]? I had no one to advise me[49, so I decided to adopt the
following course: I cross-examined the witness for the prosecution in
exactly the same manner as I should have done had not the prisoner
confessed the forgery to me, it being obviously my duty to see that the
case was legally established against my client in the dock.
But when it came to my turn to address the jury I confined myself to
bowing to both the Judge and the jury and not addressing them at all,
much to the astonishment of everyone in court. The prisoner was
convicted on this indictment 50
B. The Rules Applied
A duelist was tried on the
ground that he had done a
forbidden thing-grasped his
adversary's weapon-and a lot
of experts testified that that
couldn't be done. Then a lot of
duelists went on the stand and
said that is a fencing school rule
-when you go on the ground you go
there to kill the other man and
you do what you can.51
Therefore be merry
48See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
49Phillip's position in Courvoisier9
10 EDWARD ABINGER, FORTY YEARS AT THE BAR 277 (n.d.).
51 SHELDON M. NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES 139-40 (1989).
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For thy solicitor shall rather die
Than give thy cause away.
5 2
Laws and the natural sentiments of
man contradict one another when
oaths are administered to the
accused, binding hun to be
truthful when he can best serve his
own interests by being false; as if
a man could really swear to
contribute to his own destruction 53
"Look, whatever you want me to say, I'll say, if you want me to lie, I'll
lie. I'll say whatever it takes to, you know to arrest these guys, or to
get these guys, or whatever it is." [Goetz, the victim of the mugging
which preceded his celebrated subway shooting spree] was surprised that
the police rebuked hum for his willingness to falsify evidence.5
I want to say a few words about lawyers' attitudes to the rules m the
United States. These are personal views, based on personal experiences.
Let me first quote a British commentator on British attitude:
Generally speaking, the barrister representing the accused in England.
does not proceed upon the notion that his function is to obtain an acquittal
by enforcing each and every rule applicable to the trial m the hope that the
prosecution will falter. Nor does the defense barrister consider it proper
to interject irrelevant matters into the case to confuse the jury, to require
witnesses testifying as to uncontested matters to appear in court, to object
to break the flow of damaging testimony, to turn the trial into an
accusation against the complainant or the police where not called for
clearly by the evidence, or to ask the jury to try the prosecutor, the judge,
or society rather than the accused."5
52 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 1, lines 3.3:26-28, in WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE COMPLETE WORKS (Stanley Wells & Gary Taylor eds.,
Clarendon Press 1988).
53 CESAREBECCARIA, ON CRIMES ANDPUNISHMENTS 29 (HenryPaolucci trans.,
Bobbs-Merrill 1963) (1764).
"4 FLETCHER, supra note 22, at 13 (citation omitted).
55 Miller, supra note 14, at 223 (citing P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS,
FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 368 (1987) (quoting MICHAEL
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I offer tis quotation to set up an important distinction. 6 Few people
actually in trouble in the United States would want such a lawyer. The
typical American expects to win his or her own case, even if dearly held
notions of ethics have to be abandoned along the way 57
Returning to our list of Model Rules which prohibit various forms of
lying, we can summarize them by saying that, in addition to the rules
prohibiting the knowinguse ofperjury, the advocate is also prohibited from
lying to the court and from asserting hIs or her personal opinion or belief.
False inputation of guilt during cross-examination would appear to be
prohibited, but there is no explicit language prohibiting the cross-examina-
tion of a "truthful" witness. There is a limited duty to disclose law to the
court. There are also general prohibitions against lying and committing
fraud, and these prohibitions apply even when we are dealing with other
lawyers and non-lawyers out of court, subject to a caveat about confidenti-
ality
Are these rules followed? (1) Many lawyers probably do not like the
current rule on perjured testimony Whether or not they will admit it, they
would like to have the Freedman rule. Some follow the Model Rule, and
some do not. Few get caught if they do not follow it. (2) Lawyers like to
H. GRAHAM, TIGHTENING THE REINS OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 236 (1983))).
56 I also wonder if the source of these platitudes had read many volumes of
Notable British Trials.
Let me say a few other things at the risk of offending. I have heard that the
British system of educating, training, and admitting advocates is somewhat class-
based. Control is exercised by the Inns. Until recently there was no 'formal code"
of lawyer conduct. Lawyers do not report the misconduct of other lawyers.
Disciplinary proceedings take place in an atmosphere of secrecy. Baristers are
immune from lawsuits for malpractice. In contrast, Americans insist on democratic
access to the professional ranks and, more and more, are calling for the dismantling
of unauthorized practice barriers, the curbing of the power of bar associations, the
adoption of ever more detailed codes of conduct (usually at the behest of
journalists, who, mcidently, reject the adoption of codes to govern their own
conduct, although a free and independent bar may be as important as a free press),
mandatory lawyer reporting of the misconduct of other lawyers, open disciplinary
proceedings, and more "accountability" for lawyers!
" Many times I have recommended a lawyer, noting along the way that he or
she was a straight-shooter and highly ethical. The usual response is, "I want
someone who will screw the other side, strip the meat off their bones!" Americans
say they want ethical lawyers, but they do not shop for ethical lawyers. Some say
that there is aGresham's Law at work m the lawyer marketplace, the "bad" lawyers
are driving out the "good."
1998-99]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Ky. L.J. 937 1998-1999
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
believe, and certainly will say when asked, that a lawyer should never lie
to the court. Some lawyers lie to the court nevertheless, some regularly and
rather brazenly (3) Many lawyers do not know that there is a rule against
asserting one's personal opinion or belief. When the Kentucky Model
Rules were drafted, we spoke to lawyers about them prior to their adoption.
Many lawyers angrily charged that I had invented Rule 3.4(e). When they
learned that it was actually already m the existing Disciplinary Rules, they
fell silent or changed the subject. (4) American lawyers do not shrink from
cross-examining the "truthful" witness. Also, it is not uncommon for
lawyers to falsely attribute guilt or misconduct to parties and witnesses. If
American lawyers are to be believed, much crime in the United States is
committed by wandering bands ofunidentified and unidentifiable criminal
elements. (5) Many lawyers fail to disclose controlling law to the court.
Indeed, the Kentucky Supreme Court explicitly rejected the Model Rule
requiring lawyers to disclose controlling authority' They did so without
comment or explanation, although the duty was set forth in the earlier
Disciplinary Rules. (6) Many lawyers routinely, and some proudly, lie to
other lawyers and non-lawyers. They are not students of Kant. They are
followers of lawyer-philosopher Grotius, insisting that others have no right
to expect the truth, or have the status of barbarians. Anyone who is not the
client is to be treated as a deadly enemy who has no right to truthful
answers.5 8 Let me also say that a substantial number of lawyers probably
violate Model Rules 3.4(a) and (b), and these rules simply state that a
lawyer must obey the dictates of the criminal law's
58 See generally BOK, supra note 13, at 162. In Michael Higgins, Fine Line,
A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 52, the author quotes an American law professor's view
of the effect of etlucs rules on improper witness preparation: "'If the lawyers do
not believe in these rules, they will find a way to get around them.' "Id. at 57 For
a widely cited, if controversial, article written by an American lawyer, see Curtis,
supra note 15.
59 In contrast, note the arguments m UnitedStates v. Cintolo, 818 F.2d 980 (1st
Cir. 1987). In this case, a defense lawyer's conviction for obstruction ofjustice was
upheld after he continued to advise his "client' (for the benefit of a third party) to
assert the Fifth Amendment privilege even after the witness/client had been
immunized. The attorney's lawyers and helpful amict from the Massachusetts
Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys advanced the proposition that "[s]o
long as an attorney tenders a facially legitimate explanation for conduct performed
in the course of his defense of a client, a fact-finder must evaluate the behavior
on that basis .Hidden motivations, how so ever corrupt, remain forever ldden
"Id. at 990 (emphasis added). This will "insulate lawyers from encroachments
on the 'zealous representation' of clients accused ofcrnme."Id. Needless to say, the
[VOL. 87
HeinOnline  -- 87 Ky. L.J. 938 1998-1999
THE PROFESSIONAL AND THE LIAR
So much for bright lines. Needless to say, where the lines are not
bright, one can hardly expect any more in the way of enforcement. No case
exhibits this better than In reA.,6 which was decided by the Supreme Court
of Oregon m 1976. The lying m this case was not done by a criminal
defendant facing the death penalty Instead, we have yet another example
of asset-hiding m a divorce case. That is to say, we have perjury committed
for the sake of a relatively small-surprisingly small-amount of money 61
Several years prior to the initiation of a first round of divorce proceed-
ings, the mother of Gordon Goheen, the client on one side of the "v ", was
overtaken by the ravages of old age senility Since Gordon had obtained a
power of attorney, he simply took possession of his mother's assets,
liquidated them, and invested the boodle in a mutual fund in his own name.
As the woman's only offspring and heir, he was appointed guardian.
Gordon and his wife were divorced in 1966, without any question arising
as to the mother's funds or the guardianship. The Goheens later remarried.
Inevitably, as mght follows day, another petition for divorce was filed in
1971. Goheen lired lawyer A.62
In the course of is representation of Goheen, lawyerA discovered that
Goheen had never filed a proper inventory of the guardianship assets.
Furthermore, he had applied for and received welfare benefits for his
mother's support without making any disclosure of her assets (the mutual
funds) in the welfare application. At the time of the application the boodle
had grown to $20,000, makingthe nondisclosures almost certainly material
and fraudulent. LawyerA quite properly instructed Goheen to terminate the
welfare payments. "Shortly thereafter . Goheen advised [A] that his
mother had died and was buried in Salem [and that he had] contacted the
First Circuit did not accept tis proposition. For a detailed discussion of cases
involving the prosecution of lawyers for perjury, subornation of perjury,
obstruction of justice, and witness-tampering, see Richard H. Underwood,
Pejury!-The Charges and the Defenses, 36 DUQUESNE L. REv 715 (1998)
[hereinafter Underwood, Peijury!-The Charges and the Defenses].
I In re A., 554 P.2d 479 (Or. 1976).
61 In divorce cases, it is often the case that the smaller the marital estate, the
more bitter the fight between the divorcing partners will be. Perjury is common as
well. Professor Eben Moglen has said, "Every divorce proceeding I have ever
touched has perjury-and more than potential-most of the time What do people
lie about in life? They lie about money, and they lie about sex. When litigation is
about those things, people don't tell the truth." Kate Shatzkin, Perjury Is a Crime
Seldom Prosecuted; Legal Experts Differ on How to Treat Clinton, BALTIMORE
SUN, Jan. 27, 1998, at 4A (quoting Professor Eben Moglen).62 See in re A., 554 P.2d at 480.
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Public Welfare Commission and made arrangements for repayment of the
amounts paid by the Commission.""3 A attended to the guardianship and
probate paperwork, listing the mutual funds in the inventory and so forth.
The money was transferred to the mother's estate, and the welfare claim
was paid off."
While the probate was moving along, the divorce was also grinding on.
Goheen's deposition was taken by Ins wife's lawyer. Naturally, that lawyer
began trolling for assets. Goheen alluded to the fact that he held some
mutual funds as his mother's guardian that were used for her support. This
exchanged followed:
Q Do you still do that on a regular basis?
A No, it's not being taken out now. There's been enough of an income I
believe that's been able to take care of her payments? 65
There was no further inquiry on this issue. No one asked if the mother
was still alive, and Goheen was not about to volunteer anything. Lawyers
insist that their clients not volunteer information. Our motto is "Make the
Other Side Work."'
Later, during proceedings before the tribunal, Goheen again testified
that the mutual fund belonged to Ins mother. More questions and answers:
Q Is any part of that fund being used for your mother's upkeep at this
time?
A No.
Q Where is your mother at this time?
A Salem.67
This last may have been literally true, but such a misleading answer
should be unacceptable by anyone's standards.
The Judge shouldered Ins way in:
The Court: Because your mother does not have a husband and
because you are the only son, did you enter into any verbal arrangement
63 Id.
6See id.
15Id. at 481.
"I would like to have that on a crest m Greek and Latin.
67In reA., 554 P.2d at 481.
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with her that upon her death, you do [sic] just consider this money yours
and therefore it wouldn't have to be probated m any way9
The Witness: Well, the only reason it might have to be probated -
yes.
The Court: You made that arrangement with your mother?
The Witness: Yes, that I handle her affairs. That was made, your
Honor, back when I was made power of attorney originally - after my
father's death she's been mentally, really incapacitated
The Court: Had she died in the interim, you would have treated all of
this money as your own? You would not have probated her estate as far
as these funds?
The Witness: I would have probated it only in regards to any debts
she might have, but I don't know. I had not thought that far ahead about
that type of thing because - I suppose it went as far as it did because I
didn't have other brothers or sisters, or anybody to consult. I did it on my
own.
68
Throughout the record of the case, Goheen equivocated and attempted
to misdirect the questions, m one case by turning to A for an answer to the
court's question. The lawyer did not have Goheen correct the mis-
impressions; the lawyer chose to remain silent. There is little or no doubt
that the court would have increased the award to the wife had it known the
true facts.
The lawyer was charged with complicity in falsely misleading the
court, and a disciplinary Trial Committee concluded that the lawyer
violated old Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B),69 reasoning that the rule required
the lawyer to reveal the client's fraud to the court.7 An earlier ABA
68 Id. at 481-82.
69 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrITy DR 7-102(B) (1969).
70 See In re A., 554 P.2d at 484; cf In re Carroll, 244 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1951)
(holding that a lawyer "should not sit by silently and permit his client to com-
mit what may have been perjury, and which certainly would mislead the court
and the opposing party on a matter vital to the issue under consideration"). At the
time of A's alleged misconduct, Oregon's Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B), as m
Kentucky, provided "in effect, that if the lawyer knows that his client has
perpetrated a fraud on the tribunal, he shall call upon the client to rectify the same,
and if the client refuses, the lawyer is required to reveal the fraud to the tribunal."
In re A., 554 P.2d at 485. The In re A. opinion does not address the possible
technicality that Goheen did not commit perjury because he told the literal truth.
For a case dealing with tlus technicality, see Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S.
352 (1973).
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opinon, 1 interpreting an amended version of DR 7-102(B),' had sug-
gested that there was no duty of candor to the tribunal sufficient to override
an obligation to safeguard the confidences and secrets of the client. With
tins in mind, the Reviewing Board split hopelessly over whether A had a
duty to disclose, a duty to withdraw without disclosing, or a duty to the
client to keep silent and do nothing. The reviewing court then concluded
thatA had not had sufficient guidance and that he should not be disciplined.
[T]here has been substantial disagreement m the Bar over wnch rule takes
precedence in this kind of situation-the duty to disclose or the duty to
protect the client's confidences and secrets
[As for a duty to withdraw,] the accused was never formally charged
with any failure to withdraw as a violation of professional conduct.'
In the future, more would be expected. A lawyer mA's position would have
a [mandatory] duty to withdraw from representing the client,74 but lawyer
A was off the hook this time. Case dismissed!
The ABA Model Rules have now been considered by each state's
governing authority Each state bar has had an opportunity to tell us which
71 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341
(1975).
' The 1974 amendment, wuch was formally adopted in very few states, added
a final provision to DR 7-102(B): "except when the information is protected as a
privileged communication." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY DR
7-102(B) (1974). The ABA opimon interpreted "privileged" to include not only
confidential information within the attorney-client evidentiary privilege, but also
"secrets" of the client See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 341 (1975). Secrets included any information gamed during the
relationship, the disclosure of which could be detrimental or embarrassing to the
client. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT DR 4-101(A) (1983).
7 In reA., 554 P.2d at 487
' An Oregon Ethics Committee Opinion issued after the conduct in question
stated that the lawyer must withdraw in these circumstances, but not disclose. See
id.
By way of comparison to the conduct in In re A, consider the curious goings
on in the deposition of President William Jefferson Clinton in the Paula Jones
sexual harassment case. During that deposition, there had been an effort to pm
things down with a detailed definition of the meaning of "sexual relations" between
the President and Ms. Lewmsky. After some questiomng, the President's lawyer
Robert Bennett urged Judge Susan Weber Wright to limit further mqumes on the
ground that Ms. Lewmsky had given an affidavit "saying that there rs abso-
lutely no sex of any land of any manner, shape orform, with President Clinton."
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rule reflects its official position on the lawyer's responsibilities with
respect to perjured testimony. ABA Formal Opinion 93-3767s now states
that the lawyer has a duty to correct false statements given m a deposition,
KENNETH STARR, THE STARRREPORT202 (PocketBooks 1998) (emphasis added).
When Judge Wright cautioned Mr. Bennett that she did not want any coaching
of the witness, Bennett insisted that the president was already fully aware of the
contents of the affidavit. The president took this all in and made no effort to
disagree with the use of the affidavit, saying nothing to contradict what his lawyer
was saying to the judge. Later, he would claim that the statements were literally
true. He had had some kind of sexual contacts with Ms. Lewmsky m the past, but
this was in the past at the time the deposition was given. Mr. Bennett had simply
said that there is no sex; this was true at the time Mr. Bennett uttered Ins sentence.
See id. On September 30, 1998, after the cat was out of the bag so to speak, Mr.
Bennett sent a letter to Judge Wright informing her that she should not rely on Ms.
Lewmsky's affidavit or on Mr. Bennett's characterization of its contents. See Peter
Yost, More Legal Problems Loom for Clinton, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio),
Oct. 10, 1998, at 10A, News, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 9, 1998, at 6A. One assumes
that Bennett was attempting to fulfill his obligations under Model Rule 3.3. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1998).
Professor Gillers has raised the question of whether cases such as Bronston v.
United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973), which says that the witness who has given a
literally true but deliberately misleading answer has not committed peijury, might
also protect a lawyer who "counsel[s] a client on how to dodge a question." Terry
Carter, Terms ofEmbitterment, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1998, at 42, 44. Lawyer critic
Carter alludes to the case ofAnderson v. Children's National Medical Center, No.
92-233 (D.D.C. 1992). In a deposition in that case, the witness was asked whether
he knew of the whereabouts of the original of a document. The witness's lawyer
interrupted to throw the hunter off the track: "Have you got the original of tins?"
Carter, supra, at 44. The witness then gave a literally true answer. "[N]o." Id. The
witness had just given the sought-after original to his counsel, who had it in her
briefcase during the deposition! Compare the following criticism of "lawyers'
logic" from AUGUSTUS DE MORGAN, FORMAL LOGIC: OR, THE CALCULUS OF
INFERENCE, NECE[SS]ARY AND PROBABLE 270 (1847):
We are often reminded of the two men who [s]tole the leg of mutton [in
the Aesop fable of The Two Boys and the Butcher]; one could [s]wear he
had not got it, the other that he had not taken it The an[s]wer of the
owner of the leg of mutton is [s]ometimes to the point, 'Well gentlemen,
all I can [s]ay is, there is a rogue between you.' That a barri[s]ter is able
to put off his foren[s]ic principles with his wig, nay more, that he
becomes an upright and impartial judge in another wig, is curious, but
certainly true.
Id.
7 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-376
(1993).
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even though doing so would reveal client confidences. 6 One would think
that sufficient attention has been drawn to these problems so that one could
say with some confidence that a lawyer ought to know where the limits are,
on a state-by-state basis at least. Still, m the United States, rules that are
written by a bar committee and adopted by a state's high court may not
reflect any real consensus." In application, a rule may not be much of a
rule after all. What lawyers do and what they say they do are still two
different things, and what they say they do may vary depending upon the
audience.
C. New Rules for a New Game?
I sought no trickery, nor swore false oaths.7'
"We have strict statutes,
and most biting laws. 7 9
[Dick the Butcher.]
"The first thing we do let's
kill all the lawyers."'
For the most part, Americans do not read Shakespeare anymore and do
not know that Dick was a follower of the Kentish rebel Jack Cade, who led
an uprising during the disastrous reign of the weakling Henry VI. While
76 See id.
7 I have encountered lawyers who quote the American Trial Lawyer
Association's Code of Conduct as if it were the governing law. That code has never
been adopted in any jurisdiction and was more or less a trial balloon or advocacy
document floated by the ATLA when that organization was lobbying against the
ABA Model Rules. Another source of confusion are ethics opinions issued by
organizations such as the National Defense Lawyers' Association. Opinions issued
by specialty bar associations may or may not be useful and will not provide a
lawyer with any certain cover. For further discussion, see Underwood, Confessions
ofan Ethics Chairman, supra note 25, at 145-46, and RichardH. Underwood, Part-
Time Prosecutors and Conflicts ofInterest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 KY.
L.J. 1, 104 (1993).
78 BEOWULF, line 2738, as quoted in C.S. LEWIS, THE ABOLITION OF MAN 62
(1946).
79WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FORMEASURE act 1, sc. 4, line 1.3:19, in
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 52.
80 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act
4, sc. 2, line 4.2:78, in SHAKESPEARE, supra note 52.
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Dick's lines find many a sympathetic ear these days, few consider the
context. Cade and Dick were about to hold a kangaroo court and put to
death the clerk Emmanuel (a play on words, since documents of the day
were often prefixed with the word Emmanuel, meaning "God with us")
because he was able to write ins name. A little later, Cade and his rowdy
boys executed Lord Say Granted, Say had been sent against them and
would have had Cade's head if he had been able to take it, but what really
set our collectivist-minded proles into a state of frenzy was the fact that
Say let slip some lines of Latin."1 Cade's campaign theme was that "all
scholars, lawyers, courtiers, gentlemen"-these "false caterpillars"-must
die.82 Then the people would hold all things m common.
Our century has seen many Cades. Among his most recent incarnations
are the followers of the monster Pol Pot." Once the law and the lawyers
81 See id. sc. 7
2 d. sc. 3. In the United States, similar courts are setting up shop illegally "in
at least a dozen states indicting public officials, conducting mock trials, issuing
phony judgments and filing fabricated liens. 'Attorneys are the enemy. They
have made their own laws-laws of precedent rather than law[s] of man,' [says one
of the proponents ofthese "common law" courts]." Hope Viner Samborn, Courting
Trouble: Emergence of Common Law Courts Raise Concerns Among Critics,
A.B.A. J., Nov. 1995, at 33; see also John Hanna, "Christian Court" Finds Judge
"Guilty," NAT'L L.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at A8 (recounting meeting of "Supreme
Court of Christian Jurisdiction" that met m the Kansas Statehouse and tried and
found guilty U.S. District Judge J. Thomas Marten on a variety of charges,
including treason). The leader of tis "court' is affiliated with the Kansas
Territorial Agricultural Society, which is an offshoot of the anti-government Posse
Comitatus. Historically, Kansas has been something of an American Kent. For a
portrait of America's Dick the Butcher, see the front page of the National Law
Journal from May 8, 1995. See NAT'L L.J., May 8, 1995, at Al.
In March 1996, a group called the Freemen began an extended confrontation
with federal agents at a remote ranch in Montana. The Freemen allegedly do not
recognize the established courts, nor much of established law, and insist on being
tried in their own courts for crimes committed against persons outside their group.
Meanwhile, another news account described the goings on ofa session of"Our One
Supreme Court of Common Law," held at the Hannibal, Missouri Ramada Inn. In
an unintended parody of Shakespeare's Henry VI, any lawyers present were
required to take an oath denouncing the bar association. The article ended with a
tale of violence and threats of murder directed at court recorders in Califorma. See
Angie Cannon, Common-law Courts Used to Attack Judges, LawKyers With Phony
Liens, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), June 2, 1996, at Al.
3 The Anka Leu knew how to tap the same undercurrents that were tapped by
Cade. For a discussion of the education of some of the managers of the mass
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have been done away with, the true nature of the new order emerges. The
beast shows its face and bares its teeth.
Cade: "Away' Bum all the records of the realm, my mouth shall be the
Parliament of England. The proudest peer m the realm shall not wear
a head on his shoulders unless he pay me tribute. There shall not a maid
be marred, but she shall pay to me her maidenhead ere they have it."
84
Killing all the lawyers is overkill; yet killing all the lawyers is just the
beginning of the killing. A somewhat fictionalized Sir Thomas More
(created by Robert Bolt) warned us m these terms:
[When you had cut the last law down], and the Devil turned round on
you-where would you hide the laws all being flat? This country's
planted thick with laws from coast to coast. and if you cut them down
d'you really think you could stand upnght m the winds that would
blow then? 5
In actuality, More must not have thought much of other lawyers
(although he was Chancellor of England), for he had ls Utopians ban them
from their island.16 Utopians are high on the banning of lawyers and the
killings, see DAVID CHANDLER, BROTHERNUMBER ONE: APoLITIcAL BIOGRAPHY
OF POL POT 19-42 (1992). Chandler notes that Rousseau was one of Saloth Sar's
(Pol Pot) favorites. See id. at 34. Television news wants us to believe that a
deceased Pol Pot was immolated m a bonfire of furniture and worn tires on the
Cambodian-Thai border on or about April 17, 1998. 1 would like to believe it.
84 SHAKESPEARE, supra note 80, act 4, sc. 7, lines 4.7:12-14. Compare the plans
ofCade's progenitor, Wat Tyler, who is said to have boasted, "that within four days
there should be no laws in England save those which proceeded out of his own
mouth." CHARLES OMAN, THE GREAT REVOLT OF 1381, at 72 (Haskell House
1968) (1906). His lieutenant, Jack Straw, was motivated by the same song as the
homicidal followers of Pot: "[W]hen there was no one greater or stronger or more
learned than ourselves surviving, we would have made such laws as pleased us."
Id. at 82. In is younger days, Pol Pot complained that under the Cambodian
monarchy the people were "'like animals, kept as soldiers (pot) or slaves (knjom
ke), made to work night and day to feed the king and his entourage."' CHANDLER,
supra note 83, at 40. Sadly, this is exactly how Pol Pot treated the people-and
worse-when he came to power.
85 ROBERTBOLT, AMANFORALL SEASONS act 1, at 66 (Random House 1962).
86 See THOMAS MORE, UTOPIA 68-69 (Robert M. Adams trans. and ed., W W
Norton & Co. 1975) (1516).
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simplification of the law A near contemporary utopian writer, Mambrino
Roseo, imagined an ideal commonwealth, Garamantia, that
only had seven laws-[but] they reveal the dehumanizmg neatness to
which Utopiamsm was prone [and still is]. The first law was that the other
laws should never be changed; the second that only two gods should be
worshipped, one the lord of life, the other of death; the third, that
everyone should be dressed in identical clothing to avoid envy and
ostentation; the fourth that any woman having more than three children
should be killed; the fifth, that anyone detected in telling a lie should be
put to death; the sixth, that all inheritances should be split into equal parts;
the seventh, that no man should be allowed to live for more than fifty and
no woman more than forty years.
87
These laws probably strike most ofus as draconian solutions to the world's
problems, but at least a few of these mad measures (or something close,
anyway) have actually been put in practice m one or more countries of the
world, even m (especially in?) modem times!
That thought brings us to some reflections on some new attitudes and
to some new rules of the game. Some prosecutors are beginning to target
lawyers using the ethics rules and the criminal laws. In order to understand
the reach-I would say the overreach-of these new "biting laws,"88 let us
consider the following cases involving the cross-examination ofwitnesses
in open court.
The first case is Kiner v. State.9 Kiner was convicted of robbing a
Family Express Store m Michigan City, Indiana, and appealed. He
complained that the trial court improperly excluded from evidence a
photograph and any reference to it. The photograph was offered during the
87 JOHN HALE, THE CIVILIZATION OF EUROPE IN THE RENAISSANCE 415 (1994)
(emphasis added).
8 These laws are 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1512 (1996), which I discuss in
Underwood, Perjury/-The Charges and the Defenses, supra note 59, at 767-69,
775-88.
89 Kiner v. State, 643 N.E.2d 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). The court cited a
number of cases it considered analogous, including some in which defense counsel
had secretly substituted someone for the defendant at the defense table in the hope
that the "eyewitness" would erroneously point out the sub as the perpetrator.
Several courts have opined that tis is an unethical dirty trick. Sanctions and
contempt citations have been handed out. See id. at 953. The Kiner opinion also
cites RICHARD H. UNDERWOOD & WLLIAM T. FORTUNE, TRIAL ETHICS (1988).
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cross-examination of Ms. Gumms, the storekeeper and eyewitness who
identified Kiner as the robber. During the cross-examination oftlus critical
witness, the defense lawyer showed Ms. Gumms a photograph, defendant's
exhibit "B."
Q: I'm going to show you what's been marked as Defendant's "B,["]
wnch is a picture of Alex Kiner when he had shorter hair. If you had seen
that picture, would you have picked it out? (Indicating.)
A. Yes, sir.
Q: That's him?
A. Yes, sir.
Q: No doubt?
A. No doubt.90
The lawyer then revealed that the photograph was not Kiner. Defense
counsel had lied to the witness91 when he told the witness that the man in
the picture was Kiner but with shorter hair. It was instead someone named
Lacey Gay The trial court viewed this as an improper trick, refused to
admit the photo into evidence, and admomshed the jury to disregard any
reference to it. The judge rejected the argument that counsel was "merely
engaging in the' art of cross-examination.' "I One may very well agree that
this was the land of greasy kad stuff that should be discouraged in a court
of law, although I doubt that every "John Doe" would find it objectionable.
Some lawyers would find it perfectly acceptable. But how much time
should we spend fussing about sanctions in a case like this? Not very much.
Move on with the case! Having said that, I have a very strong feeling that
somewhere out there there is a federal prosecutor or two, and maybe even
a judge, who would be more than willing to draw the disciplinary gun or
read 18 U.S.C. § 1512, the new "Riot Act," to the lawyer.931 am not alone
m my paranoia4-and they are actually out to get us, after all.
90 Kiner, 643 N.E.2d at 952-53.
91This would be aviolation OfMODELRULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
4.1(a) (1998).
92Kiner, 643 N.E.2d at 954.
3 18 U.S.C. § 1512 includes language that criminalizes as obstruction ofjustice
"misleading conduct" engaged in with intent to influence awitness's testimony. 18
U.S.C. § 1512.
94 See John Wesley Hall, Jr., Defensive Defense Lawyerng or Defending the
Criminal Defense Lanyer from the Client, 11 U. ARK. LTTLE ROCK L. REV 329
(1988-89).
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My second case comes from Alan Dershowitz's book The Best
Defense.5 Professor Dershowitz gives us the blow-by-blow of his battle
with akey prosecution witness against his client. The witness had been tape
recorded during certain critical conversations, but one crucial statement
was not on the tape. The strategy of the cross-exammer was to induce the
witness to believe that there were no tapes, so that he would lie, believmg
that it was one man's word against another. "We would elicit answers from
him that we knew-while he did not-would be exposed as lies by his own
words as recorded by the hidden tape machine."96 Then the cross-exammer
would mcorporate some materials from the tape, verbatim, planting in the
witness's mindthe existence oftape recordings of the conversation. 97 Then
the cross-examiner would pretend to continue verbatim quotations from a
make-believe transcript, in the hope of getting the witness to adopt the
statements in the make-believe (or "reconstructed") transcript-to lead the
witness to assume that anything the defense lawyer alluded to was in hand
and irrefutable, on the tapes and mthe transcripts to which Dershowitz was
referring during Ins cross-examination.98 If this strategy had the desired
effect, then Dershowitz could ask about crucial statements that were not on
the tapes or in the transcripts of them, anticipating, correctly, that the
witness would concede that they were made.9 Dershowitz felt that this was
permissible, since Ins client had assured hin that the promises had been
made, and since he was only trying to catch a liar. He had a factual basis
for assuming that the unrecorded statements or promises had been given,
and he was acting in good faith in an effort to find the truth. 1e The ploy
worked. Dershowitz appeared to be reading from a transcript, and the
witness took the bait. But the tables were turned when the court got
involved in the cross-examination, and began asking the professor to read
lines of the transcript to pm down the evasive witness who was attempting
to qualify his answers. Dershowitz played along, and the day ended on a
high note. The witness had been destroyed.'0 Or so it seemed.
Unfortunately, when the tapes were turned over, the prosecutor used
them agamst Professor Dershowitz, arguing that Dershowitz had" 'misled
the Court and misled the witness' by reading apparent 'quotations' that
95 ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE 52-67 (1982).96 Id. at 52.
97 See id.91 See id. at 52-53.
9 See id.
'0 See id.
101 See id. at 52-60.
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were not on the tape."'02 The court took the prosecutor's side of it,
criticized Dershowitz, and ruled that he would ignore what was on the
tapes, the fact that the tapes inpeached the witness, and the witness's
crucial admission.103
Had Dershowitz done anything wrong? If he had, it is hard to articulate
exactly what it was. He had not actually lied to the court or the witness.
Still, one wonders whether in the current climate, ifthe cross-examiner had
been an unknown, or a novice, would the court have imposed dracoman
sanctions? Would the prosecutor have moved to disqualify, filed a bar
complaint, or pressed charges under 18 U.S.C. § 1512?
One commentator tells us that "[o]ne ethical rule of thumb is, never
suggest unrecalled details of a relevant event that are anything other that
what you believe to be true."'" Tns is sage advice, since lying to a witness
in an effort to mislead them and with a view to obtaining false testimony
could (theoretically, at least) lead to the lawyer's prosecution for obstruc-
tion of justice and witness tampering.15 However, there is some hope that
courts will exercise caution ifprosecutors (who may, after all, be motivated
to prosecute for tactical reasons) will not. I offer the reader the views of the
judges of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Resolution Trust
Corp. v. Bnght, 06 which, although it is a civil case, may nevertheless prove
useful to the lawyer who finds himself or herself on the defensive.
In Brnght, several shareholders, directors, and officers of Bright Banc
Savings Association in Dallas were sued by Resolution Trust Corporation
("RTC") for fraud, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty But in a
strange twist, the RTC lawyers handling the case became the target of
sanctions (including"disbarment" from practicing before the district court)
on the theory that they had acted unproperly during their interviews of one
Barbara Erhart, formerly the Semor Vice President of Finance Support at
the Bright Banc. The gist of the allegations was that after their interviews
of Ms. Erhart, the lawyers had asked her to return to their office and sign
an affidavit "summarizing" what she had told them in the course of the
interviews. The affidavit apparently contained some statements that the
witness had not given to the lawyers, but which the lawyers believed were
'01 Id. at61.
103 See id. at 63.
"
4 James M. Altman, Witness Preparation Conflicts, LrrIG., Fall 1995, at 38,
41.
o5 See infra Part II.
" Resolution Trust Corp. v. Bnght, 6 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 1993).
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supported by the evidence. 7 The lawyers did not attempt to bide the fact
that new statements had been added. Indeed, they "brought the statements
to her attention and warned her to read them carefully"1"8 m the hope of
persuading her to see their theory of the case. They may have been
"persistent and aggressive,"' 9 but the witness testified that she did not feel
mtimidated and only felt that the lawyers were "doing their job."'10 The
witness rejected some of the additions and made changes of her own. She
then read and approved the final affidavit."1 On the motion of the
defendants, the trial judge ruled that the lawyers had "tampered" with the
witness's evidence, had attempted to "manufacture" evidence, and had
"probably violated" 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 1512 as well as Texas Rules of
Professional Conduct 3.04, 4.01(a), and 4.04(a)!"' Fortunately, the
appellate court set aside the sanctions."3 The interviewing may have been
aggressive and even "sometimes laborious," but the interviews were only
conducted to obtain "an accurate and favorable affidavit from a key
witness.""14 Thus it was an effective strategy, but a happy ending was
reached only after much delay, expense, and anxiety There are lessons to
be learned here.
D. Conclusion
When the district attorney arose and the jury turned to hun with uplifted
faces, then, for the first time, I realized the real attitude of the community
toward us; for m scathing terms he denounced us both as men not merely
01 See id. at 339.
'°MId. at 342.
109Id.
IO Id. at 339.
111 See id.
"
2 Id. at 340.
1 See id. at 342. The court cited United States v. Brand, 775 F.2d 1460 (1 lth
Cir. 1985), which held that giving a witness a draft affidavit that included matters
not previously discussed with the witness is not obstruction of justice, and Koller
v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 424 (1985).
"4 Bright, 6 F.3d at 342. This might be compared with the facts m Artemas
Quibble's case. See TRAIN, supra note 2, at 175-78. In that case, "Quib" prepared
the affidavit for the witness, knowing that he was untrustworthy. When the witness
took the oath, he winked and said, "It's the truth-not!" Id. at 178. Of course, he
immediately swore it was the truth when Quib impressed upon hun the importance
of the formalities. See id.
1998-991
HeinOnline  -- 87 Ky. L.J. 951 1998-1999
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
who defended criminals but who, m fact, created them; as plotters against
the administration of justice; as arch-crooks, who lived off the proceeds
of crunes which we devised and planned for others to execute. It was false
and unfair; but the jury believed hlm-I could well see that.'15
When I began collecting my thoughts about lawyers and liars, the O.1.
Simpson case was well underway, and the members of the Fourth Estate
were whippmg up a frenzy about the tactics of the defense lawyers. On
August 6, 1995, anL.A.Times editorial condemned the defense lawyers for
"flinging motes m the jurors' eyes m the hope that the jurors finally will
not see what is plainly before them." 16 But by August 18, the Simpson case
115 TRAIN, supra note 2, at 223 (recounting the thoughts of Artemas Quibble
during hIs trial for subornation of perjury-he was convicted). Quibble has not been
the only trickster to receive his just deserts, although many a slick fish has gotten
away. On the very day-January 19,1999-thatPresidentWilliam Jefferson Clinton,
a prisoner m the impeachment dock, was brazenly delivering a State of the Union
address promising to give away the store In exchange for the continued, seemingly
blind love of the American voter, former Tory Minister Jonathan Aitken-a
"meteor" of conservative politics in Britain-stood in the dock at the OldBailey and
pled guilty to perjury and "perverting the course of justice." Kamal Ahmed,
Aitken's 'Sword of Truth' Cast Aside, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 20, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 5107041, Jamie Wilson, Aitken: Guilty of Perjury and
Perverting Justice, GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 20, 1999, available in 1999 WL
5106973; A MeteorFalls: Some Truths Emerge atLast, GUARDIAN (London), Jan.
20, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5106968. The charges arose from his perjury in
a civil libel case against The Guardian (aprivate matter?). Like Oscar Wilde, he
had foolishly sued and invited hIs own destruction. The issue was a small and silly
one: who had paid his hotel bill at the Ritz in Paris? He lied, and got his daughter
to lie too, by signmg a false supporting affidavit. "[He] was caught telling a lie.
And then telling a worse one to cover it up. And a worse one after that." Wilson,
supra. Oh, what tangled webs I Only a week before he entered his plea (his
surrender), it had been learned that DNA tests proved that he had fathered a love
child 18 years earlier (these "pols" are all the same, all over the world, you say?).
Aitken resigned his membership in the Privy Council. He awaits sentencing. See
id.
President Clinton has also received hs just deserts. Although he survived
impeachment, he has been held in contempt of court in the suit brought by Paula
Jones. This ruling may affect Clinton financially and in his ability to practice law
in the furture. See Jill Abramson, Analysis: For Clinton, A Jarrmng Legal
Aftershock, N.Y TIMES NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 13, 1999.
116 Neal Gabler, How We Know What We Know: Logic Meets Illogic at Simpson
Trial, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1995, available in 1995 WL 9814417
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had turned into the Fuhrman case, and the Fuhrman case was looking
substantial after all. Detective Mark Fuhrman had clearly lied under oath
about something.117 Had he lied about how he found critical items of
evidence? Had there been a frame? If so, hadthe police framed an innocent
man or a guilty one? Few remained who thought that the answer to that
question mattered much in terms of the outcome of O.J.'s crminaltrial. By
then it was predictable. Damn lawyers!
Lawyer bashers keep telling us that a new day is dawning. Apparently
there is talk on Capitol Hill ofthe need for national lawyer regulation under
standards drafted by the House and Senate! 18 Ignoring the blatant
hypocrisy of it all, it is worrying how the folks in Washington can have so
little appreciation of the need for an independent bar, and so little
recoliection of the terror that has accompanied government control of
lawyers in times and places not so very distant from our own. But if federal
regulation is not bad enough, some continue to argue that the time has
come for respectable society to bid adieu to the lawyer.
Bold, hasty, and wise, a concocter of lies.
A rattler to speak, a dodger, a sneak,
A regular claw of the tables of law,
A shuffler complete, well worn in deceit,
A supple, unprincipled, troublesome cheat;
A hang-dog accurst, a bore with the worst,
In the tricks of the jury-courts thoroughly versed." 9
I7 On October 3, 1996, (now retired) Detective Fuhrman pled "no contest" to
a misdemeanor count ofpeijury and received a sentence of probation coupled with
a small fine. See Fuhrman Gets Probation for Lying in Simpson Trial, COURIER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), Oct. 3, 1996, at 1. The California Attorney General
crowed at his triumph over police corruption, see id., but one suspects that this
outcome will have little deterrent effect on police perjury.
18 I have this on the authority of a young lawyer who called me in my capacity
as a member of the Kentucky Bar Association's "Ethics Hotline." I answered his
ethics question to his satisfaction, whereupon he turned on me and berated me for
10 minutes, letting me know, among other things, that the "hotline" was a farce!
He informed me that he was working with Senator Kennedy on legislation to
federalize the regulation of the bar. The prospect of a federal ethics machine
implementing legislation drafted by Senator Kennedy is a terrible thing to
contemplate.
..
9 ARISTOPHANES, THE CLOUDS 309, lines 446-52 (Benjamin Bickley Rogers
trans., Harvard Umv. Press 1982) (emphasis added).
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Still, I suspect that lawyers, ethical and unethical, will be around for some
time yet. Oh, you playwrights may scorn us, and youjournalists scold, but
the rhyme is 2400 years old!.2
II. COACHING WITNESSES:
ETHICS, UNETHICAL TECHNIQUES, AND RISKS
Let us consider the problem of coaching. American lawyers ordinarily
prepare their witnesses. 121 Most would consider it unprofessional not to go
over the expected testimony with a witness.'2 Within limits-there are
always limits-witness preparation is ethical in the United States.'I
120Apologies to Dr. Seuss. Anstophanes's play was written around 423 B.C.E.
See id. Introduction, at 262.
12 It is asserted that British, Australian, and Canadian lawyers view American
practices as unethical if not illegal. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 14, at 204.
' Cf United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288 (11th Cir. 1990).
[Witness] was an accountant called by [Codefendant A]. [Witness]
testified that an associate had prepared the chart reflecting corn orders and
deliveries and that [Witness] had reviewed the chart, comparing it to the
customer files. During the government's cross-examination, it became
apparent that [Witness] was either lying or had been extremely slipshod.
Defense counsel was informed that [Witness] in fact had not supervised the
chart; in turn, the defense lawyers told the court that they were concerned
that the witness was committing perjury. The court instructed the jury not
to consider [Witness's] testimony against [Codefendant B], and granted
[Codefendant C] a continuance to obtain another accountant. [Codefendant
A's] motion for a mistrial was denied. [Codefendant A] now argues that he
was entitled to a mistrial because, through no fault of Ins own, perjured
testimony infiltrated the trial, prejudicing hun and resulting in amiscarrage
ofjustice.
This is not a case where the defendant is ambushed by the govern-
ment, but instead a case where the defendant ill-advisedly chose to present
evidence which was subject to devastating impeachment. In an adversary
system, absent governmental misconduct affecting the evidence, a
defendant must accept the consequences of the evidence he offers. Had the
defense adequately prepared and examined [Witness] and lus proposed
testimony, the defense would not have permitted [Witness] to take the stand
and suffer such impeachment.
Id. at 1296-97
2 See UNDERWOOD & FORTUNE, supra note 89, § 11.3, at 320-23; FORTUNE
ETAL., supra note 36, § 11.4, at 364-68; Richard C. Wydick, TheEthics of Witness
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In a widely cited opinion," the justices of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina spouted this conventional [American] wisdom and then
some!
It is not improper for an attorney to prepare Is witness for trial, to
explain the applicable law in any given situation and to go over before
trial the attorney's questions and the witness' answers so that the witness
will be ready for his appearance in court, will be more at ease because he
knows what to expect, and will give his testimony in the most effective
manner that he can.[" ]
Nothing improper has occurred so long as the attorney is
preparing the witness to give the witness' testimony at trial and not the
testimony that the attorney has placed in the witness' mouth[ 126] and not
false or perjured testimony. 127
I am informed that this American attitude is not accepted elsewhere.
One commentator notes the following:
An Australian lawyer felt that from is perspective it would be unethical
to prepare a witness; a Canadian lawyer said that it would be illegal; and
Coaching, 17 CARDOZO L. REV 1, 1-2 (1995).
,
24 See State v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880 (N.C. 1979).
'z See United States v. Poppers, 635 F Supp. 1034 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (deter-
mining that it is not obstruction of justice to coach a witness to present the story in
the "best" light, as opposed to coaching a witness to lie); see also Resolution Trust
Corp. v Bright, 6 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 1993) (deciding that itis not obstruction of
justice or witness tampering to give a witness an affidavit with statements not
previously discussed in it or to attempt to persuade a witness in an arms length
interview, even aggressively, that her initial version of a certain fact situation is not
complete or accurate).
'
26 What about the lawyer suggesting a substitution of terms, for example "cut"
for "stab"9 The practice of suggesting alternative words and phrases is widespread.
See the interesting case of Haworth v. State, 840 P.2d 912, 914 (Wyo. 1992), in
wich the prosecutor learned all about "weekend trial preparation sessions" from
a deputy sheriff who was working off-duty for the defense lawyer!
127 McCormick, 259 S.E.2d at 882 (citing A. MORRILL, TRIALDIPLOMACY, Ch.
3, Part 8 (1973)). For ahelpful bar association ethics opinion, seeD.C. Bar, Formal
Op. 79 (1979). See also United States v. Torres, 809 F.2d 429, 434 (7th Cir. 1987)
(determining that defense counsel invited an objection, which was sustained, and
a reply from the prosecutor in closing argument, by persisting in characterizing as
"sinister" the prosecutor's mne-hour session with a witness).
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an American lawyer's view was that not to prepare a witness would be
malpractice. 121
I cannot vouch for the accuracy of these observations about Australian
and Canadian professional mores. As noted earlier, British barristers follow
a rule that prevents them from interviewing witnesses. There are, however,
exceptions for clients, expert witnesses, and certain character witnesses. 129
England's Standard 607.3 is worth setting out in full.
A practicing barrister must not when interviewing a witness out of court
(a) place a witness who is being interviewed under any pressure to
provide other than a truthful account of his evidence;
(b) rehearse practise or coach a witness in relation to his evidence or
the way he should give it.130
On the other hand, tins is not the same as saying that witnesses are not
prepared by someone. 31 Furthermore, the "gingering" of expert testimony
is rather widespread, both in civil and criminal cases. 32 Nevertheless, the
American attitude is wide-open by comparison.
128 Miller, supra note 14, at 204; see also Rules of Conduct for Counsel and
Judges: A Panel Discussion on English andAmercan Practices, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 865, 869-70 (1994) [heremafterA Panel Discussion].
"
9 See Miller, supra note 14, at 222 (citing CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF
ENGLAND AND WALES para. 607.3, Annexe H: Written Standards for the Conflict
of Professional Work, General Standards paras. 6.1, 6.2); see also A Panel
Discussion, supra note 128, at 868. Barrister Michael Hill opines:
The reason lying behind the [English] rule against counsel seeing witnesses
is quite simply [that] [testimony should be] the testimony of the witness
and not the result of the advocate's interrogation of the witness in
circumstances in which the witness is liable to seek to adopt the advocate's
perception of the events rather than his own recollection of those events.
Id. at 869. A skeptical questioner asked the obvious question: "[D]oesn't the same
concern apply to the defendant, his expert witnesses, and his character witnesses
[all exceptions to the English rule against meeting with witnesses]?" Id. at 879.
Banister Hill responded that while there may be some hypocrisy in the system, the
conflict is the result of striking a balance. See id.
130 CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES para. 607.3
(1993).
13 I gather that they are prepared by police officers on the prosecution side and
otherwise by solicitors. See A Panel Discussion, supra note 128, at 868.
132 See generally CAROLA.G. JONES, EXPERT WITNESSES: SCIENCE, MEDICINE,
AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1994).
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I shall point out shortly that in the United States we have "beefed up"
our criminal law in the hope of deterring pressure tactics. But preparation
and rehearsal are not in the least unusual. Where do we Americans draw the
line between permissible preparation and rehearsal and subornation of
perjury9 I can only talk around the issue, knowing that the whole subject
may shock those of you who are used to the Code of Conduct of the Bar of
England and Wales.
Most American lawyers thinkthat we know [subornation] when we see
it, even if we cannot come up with a definitional litmus test. "There is a
fine line between coaching someone to lie and coaching someone to present
a story m the 'best' light."'' Coaching, "woodshedding," or
"horseshedding" of witnesses has been viewed as ethical, while the
"gingering up [of] witness[es] ' 1134 has been condemned. Consider this
language from United States v. Root:135
Appellee Forde has injected a new element in oral argument not
contained m his brief.
He urges that an attorney in counseling his client has latitude in
aiding the client m the presentation of the client's story at trial time.
Quaere: Does this attorney-client relationship permit the client to
relate a story manufactured by the attorney as Count One of this indict-
ment charges?
Answer. No.
136
What follows is hardly a detailed catalogue of tricks used down at the
woodshed. 37 From time to time, practitioners have tried tojustify virtually
every one of these techmques on the theory that it is okay as long as the
133 United States v. Poppers, 635 F Supp. 1034, 1037 (N.D. Ill. 1986)
(determining that the latter is not obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1503
(1996)).
,3 "Gingermg up" is aBritish term. See C.P. HARVEY, THEADVOCATE'S DEVIL
65 (1958).
135 United States v. Root, 366 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1966). This case was a spin-off
of the Frank Sinatra, Jr. kidnapping affair.
136 Id. at 383.
137 For the techiques of coaching at depositions, seeln re CoordinatedPretnal
Proceedings in Petroleum ProductsAntitrustLitigation, 502 F Supp. 1092, 1096-
99 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (recounting defendant's lawyers attempt to represent lower-
level employee and former employee witnesses and control their testimony), and
Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (harshly criticizing
coaching during depositions and setting forth unusual rules or guidelines).
1998-99]
HeinOnline  -- 87 Ky. L.J. 957 1998-1999
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
lawyer is trying to get the truth.138 "All I did was tell the witness to listen
to the question, and answer only the question-don't volunteer anything."
For the most part tis is good and ethical advice. But what does the lawyer
mean to convey when he or she says that? What does the witness hear?
Such advice can go over the line.3 9
Some techniques are quite crude, and many lawyer coaches are quite
bold. I have seen witnesses carry scripts"4 and cribnotes to the stand
despite the fact that scripts and cribnotes may be seized by the cross-
examiner and turned against the witness.' 4' Most witnesses leave their
138 See, e.g., Altman, supra note 104, at 38-39. This is an excellent article. Mr.
Altman's purpose is to point out the ethical pitfalls, but as I will argue later, he may
be too ready to dismiss criticisms of the standard techniques as "academic."
139 See id. Altman suggests that the lawyer might have gone over the line m
United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422 (6th Cir. 1986), when she told witnesses
how to answer questions "truthfully" but m a manner that would divert the
examiner's attention away from the contents of a critical and "unfavorable"
conversation. See id. at 1443. Can a list of instructions to witnesses handed out
before depositions (in some venues, such a song sheet is known as a "gouge") go
too far? Much ink has been spilled regarding a document styled "points to make in
an affidavit," which is now floating around in the latest Washington, D.C., sex
scandal. See Michael Isikoff& Evan Thomas, Clinton and the Intern, NEWSWEEK,
Feb. 2, 1998, at 31, 37 Sometimes it is hard to say whether any line has been
crossed, even if something smells. For an interesting set of instructions, see
AccidentalExposure, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Jan. 1998, at 20, which sets forth the
verbatim text of law firm Baron & Budd's Preparing for Your Deposition. I like
the line (avanation on the theme of "don't volunteer") thattells witnesses that "[a]t
the deposition, it might help to pretend that you are a'pnsoner of war' in an enemy
camp where you must give only your 'name, rank, and serial number."' Id. One
assumes that there is nothing wrong with this instruction m the abstract.
140 In CHARLES W WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICs 648 n.96 (1986),
Professor Wolfram cites a case from 1880 in which a lawyer was disciplined for
writing out the answers for a witness. See In re Eldridge, 82 N.Y. 1961 (1880).
i41 See, e.g., FED. K EvID. 612. Unfortunately, not everybody understands this.
In my first or second year of practice with a firm, I faced an opposing witness m
a tiny municipal court. Durng my opponent's direct examination, I kept objecting
that the witness was reading a narrative that he (or someone) had prepared
beforehand. He actually had the whole thing written out. The witness became so
frustrated that he threw the script at me. I thought I was doing a great job, but the
judge's puzzled looks turned to anger. He thought I was being mean.
Unfortunately, the confused call the shots at all levels and notjust in the Municipal
Court of Franklin County, Ohio. Who can forget the great moments in trial
advocacy in the Iran-Contra hearings? Professor John Applegate of the University
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scripts at home. They will not need them if they have been sufficiently
"prepped."
Some lawyers get their clients and friendly witnesses to change their
stones during rehearsal by wincing or throwing up their hands when a
witness mentions a "bad fact." Some lawyers go so far as to say things like,
"If you say that, you'll lose." 42 Some will say that such things do not
happen or that they occur only in the imagmings of lawyer-hating
academics. But they do happen.
Almost as crude atechmque is "group preparation," in whichwitnesses
are prepared together and coached to give "consistent" testimony. This
used to be the sort of thing that one would expect only from law enforce-
ment officers. 43 Now lawyers on both sides of the "v" are using the
techmque in civil as well as criminal cases."' This sort of preparation can
even result in a waiver of privilege and work product,14 but only if the
lawyer "gets caught."
of Cincinnati was watching too, but unlike me, he had the presence of mind to
write some of it down. Here the questions are coming from Mr. Liman, counsel for
the Senate committee investigating the Iran-Contra affair, the answers are coming
from Lt. Col. Oliver North, and the objections are coming from Mr. Sullivan,
counsel for North:
Mr. Lunan. [Y]ou are looking at a book there. What is the book, sir?
Mr. North. The book is made up of notes that I have made in trying to
prepare with counsel for this hearing.
[Objection by] Mr. Sullivan. Don't tell him what it includes.
Mr. Liman. Well, I think that if a witness is looking at something that I, as
counsel, am entitled to see what he is refreshing his recollection with.
Mr. Sullivan. I think you are wrong. That is a product of lawyers working
with clients.
That is none of your business
John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEXAS L. REV 277,284-85 (1989).
Liman did not argue waiver of work product or attorney-client privilege, and there
was no one to rule on such fine points. Liman sunply dropped the matter! See id.
at 285.
142 Joseph D. Piorkowski, Jr., Professional Conduct and the Preparation of
Witnesses For Trial: Defining the Acceptable Limitations of "Coaching," 1 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 389, 399 (1987).
143 See Ex Parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). This
case is discussed infra text accompanying notes 261-69, 271-83.
" See Applegate, supra note 141, at 350.
45 See id. at 351.
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Perhaps not quite so bad is the so-called "hub-and-spoke" method, in
which group consistency is assured by separate interviews with members
of the group, in which each is made aware of the testimony of others.' 46
Another variation of the same theme is the way that witnesses can be
shown the error of their ways by placing their observations in "context"
"Well, that's not how your boss remembers it[']"' a7 Coercive, isn't it? On
the other hand, is it wrong to compare the witness's recollection with other
evidence if it will help them remember 9 This can be done at trial, at least
up to a point. The witness's certainty could be tested by asking the witness
if he or she is aware of the boss's testimony and so on. On the other hand,
this cross-examination would be done in open court, and the court and the
opponent could see if it were misleading and coercive. Again, arguments
can be made both ways about the legitimacy of the technique.'48 It depends
on the circumstances and on the lawyer's intent.
Some argue that even the old-fashioned "lecture" is perfectly respect-
able if the lawyer means well. Most readers know that the "lecture" was the
technique used by Jimmy Stewart (usually playing the epitome of the
straight-shooter) to help hIs client come up with a "temporary insanity"
defense in the movie Anatomy of a Murder 149 Before the defendant
committed himselfto a story, he was told about the defenses that might be
available if only there were facts to support them. The defendant was not
stupid and more or less tried the defenses on for size.
Before moving on to a brief discussion of a relatively new law that
might be used to prosecute lawyers who cross the line, I would like to note
that Monica Lewinsky's "talking points" are not the only thing that got
folks all abuzz over the ethics of witness preparation. An equally hot item
was a document that surfaced in an asbestos product liability case in Texas.
One of the plaintiffs' law firms, Baron & Budd, had provided its clients
witha document styled"Preparng forYourDeposition." It was predictable
that it would surface sooner or later at a deposition. When it did, its
contents got the firm into hot water. Several commentators have opined
146 See id. at 351 n.140. Appelgate alludes to United States v. Townsley, 843
F.2d 1070 (8th Cir. 1988), which held that commumcations with an attorney were
not privileged because the attorney separately encouraged several witnesses to give
consistent untruthful testimony.
147 Piorkowski, supra note 142, at 399.
148 See Altman, supra note 104, at 40.
14' ANATOMY OF A MURDER (Columbia Pictures 1959). The movie was based
on a 1958 play of the same name written by Judge J. Voelker of Michigan and
published under the pseudonym "Robert Travers."
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that they think this twenty-page document goes too far and tells witnesses
"how to testify" For example, the memo provides such advice as, "It is
miportant to maintain that you NEVER saw any labels on asbestos products
that said DANGER or WARNING."'150
A. The New "Witness Tampering" Law
Lawyers may be prosecuted for perjury"5 and for subornation of
perjury 112 But more recent legislation widens the net, or expands the "field
of fire" m terms of defining punishable conduct or "hostile" personnel.
These new laws include 18 U.S.C. § 1957, which makes it a felony for
anyone to knowingly engage in a financial transaction with knowledge that
the property involved is derived from crnme,"5 3 26 U.S.C. § 60501, which
mandates the reporting of cash payments for services if they equal or
exceed certain limits,"5 and 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b), which addresses witness
tampering and defines obstruction of justice as including misleading
conduct engaged m with intent to influence witness testimony 155 While
these new laws were promoted as weapons aimed at gangster types-
thugs, drug dealers, and money launderers-they are not m the least bit
discriminatory on their face. They are about as surgical as a claymore
'1O Accidental Exposure, supra note 139, at 21. For further discussion, see
SpecialReport: WitnessPreparationMemosRaise QuestionsAboutEthicalLimits,
14 Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 48 (1998). For the Lewmsky talking
points, see Lewinsky's 'TalkngPonts'For Tripp, WASH. POST, Feb. 10, 1998, at
A8. See also Michael Higgins, Fine Line, A.B.A. J., May 1998, at 52.
151 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623 (1994).
' See id. § 1622.
113 See id. § 1957
ISee 26 U.S.C. § 60501(a) (1994).
155 See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (1996). For a recent discussion of § 1512 and
related statutes, see Alicia M. Dixon et al., Obstruction ofJustice, 34 AM. CRIM.
L. REV 815 (1997). Such statutes widen the net in a variety of ways. Note in this
regard that peijury may obstruct justice, but the cases hold that perjury does not
necessarily obstruct justice. See In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224, 227-28 (1945);
United States v. Essex, 407 F.2d 214 (6th Cir. 1969). "A prerequisite to a
conviction [for obstruction oflustice] based solely on false testimony is that the
government must charge m the indictment and prove at trial that the testimony had
the effect of impeding justice." United States v. Martino, Cnm. No. 85-00150,
1988 WL 41468, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1988), aff'd, 869 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1989).
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mine.'56 Criminal defense lawyers are definitely in the kill zone'5l-maybe
even some prosecutors.'58 Jack Cade would approve of these laws.
18 U.S.C. § 1512, which covers tampering with a witness, victim, or
an informant, provides in pertinent part:
(b) Whoever knowingly uses intimidation or physical force, threatens, or
corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in
misleading conduct toward another person, with intent to-
(1) influence, delay, orprevent the testimony ofanyperson in an
official proceeding;
(2) cause or induce any person to-
156 In the course of imposing sanctions on a lawyer rn a civil case, one trial
judge alluded darkly to possible violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and § 1512. See
Clark Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg., No. 82 C 4585, 60 C 890, 1987 WL 19150
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 1987). The lawyer attempted to appeal and have the tnaljudge's
opinion vacated, but the appellate court held that all issues were moot after the
original parties to the underlying dispute settled and paid all the sanctions. The
court shrugged off the lawyer's concerns, on the theory that they were not
"concrete." Rather, they were no more than a"'speculative contingency.'" Clark
Equip. Co. v. Lift Parts Mfg., 972 F.2d 817, 820 (7th Cir. 1992). If the lawyer had
not willingly settled, shouldn't he have been given a chance to obtain appellate
review of these accusations of "possible" violations?
"
5 7 See United States v. Kalevas, 622 F Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). In United
States v. Davila, 698 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1983), the defendant and two others, one
an attorney, were indicted for conspiracy to suborn perjury. The charges against the
defendant were dismissed after he pled guilty to misprision of a felony. The lawyer
and the other alleged conspirator were later acquitted of the conspiracy to suborn
perjury. Defendant thought that he might obtain relief from his conviction on the
plea to misprision of a felony, but he was disappointed. The appellate court let the
conviction stand, quoting language from the Supreme Court that" 'while symmetry
of results may be intellectually satisfying, it is not required.' "Id. at 721 (quoting
Standefer v United States, 447 U.S. 10, 100 (1980)). United States v. Ferreyra-
Tagle, 942 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1991), reports on a Peruvian lawyer who pled guilty
to § 1512(b) witness tampering, but no details regarding the crime are provided.
158 If a federal prosecutor threatens to revoke a witness's previously granted
immunity if the witness testifies for another defendant, causing the witness to evade
a defense subpoena, has the prosecutor violated 18 U.S.C. § 1512? Consider the
turn of events reported in John Cheves, Judge, Prosecutor Erred, U.S. Appeals
Court Says, LEXINGTON IIERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), Nov 5, 1997, atB1,
discussing United States v. Foster, 128 F.3d 949 (6th Cir. 1997). Compare the
conduct m United States v. Hammond, 815 F.2d 302 (5th Cir. 1987), in wich a
prosecutor imprisoned a defense witness to prevent the witness from testifying.
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(A) withhold testimony, or withhold a record, document, or
other object, from an official proceeding;
(B) alter, destroy, mutilate, or conceal an object with intent
to impair the object's integrity or availability for use m an
official proceeding;
(C) evade legalprocess summoning that person to appear as
a witness, or to produce a record, document, or other object, in
an official proceeding; or
(D) be absent from an official proceeding to which such
person has been summoned by legal process;
shall be fined [by not more than $250,000] or impris-
oned not more than ten years, or both.
(d) In aprosecutionfor an offense under this section, it is an
affirmative defense, as to which the defendant has the burden of
proof by a preponderance of the evidence, that the conduct
consisted solely of lawful conduct and that the defendant's sole
intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the otherperson to
testify truthfully. 159
One assumes that in the current scandal wars in Washington, the
argument under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 would run something like tins: Momca
Lewmsky may have violated the statute when she tried to persuade Linda
Tripp to lie in a deposition using the "talking points." If someone gave
Momca the "points" to do that, told her to try the tactics set forth in the
"points," told her to evade or delay giving testimony by going to another
jurisdiction, told her something misleading like "they don't prosecute
perjury in civil cases," or got her ajob after having a discussion with her,
then that someone could have a § 1512 problem. It does not look like it
would be all that difficult to make aprmafacie case under the statute. Of
course, securing a conviction is another thing.
Are any ofthe techniques of coaching listed above "witness tampering"
under the new crinnal statute? Remember that a violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1512(b)(1) can be based on the lawyer's "misleading conduct" toward the
witness with "intent to influence" the witness's testimony in an official
proceeding. That is all there is to aprnmafacie case.1 0 It is an affirmative
159 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1996) (emphasis added).
1o In Kiner v. State, 643 N.E.2d 950 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), defense counsel
falsely suggested to an eyewitness on the stand that an old photo was a photo of the
defendant When the witness took the bait and testified that she could have picked
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defense, which the defendant lawyer must establish by a preponderance of
the evidence, that Ins or her conduct "consisted solely of lawful conduct
andthat [the lawyer's] sole intentionwas to encourage, induce, or cause the
other person to testify truthfully ",
Lawyer John Wesley Hall, Jr. provides witness tampering scenarios
that might be encountered by a crinmal defense lawyer:
Your client says "Witness B is going to say such-and-such about me. I'm
going to talk to hin and get him to not be so positive against me. He
knows the truth." Worse, your client says "I'm going to show him why he
needs to change Ins story." Or worse, your client says "I'm going to pay
it out as the defendant, counsel triumphantly announced that it was not actually a
photo of the defendant. The court was not amused and rebuked counsel for a
violation of Model Rule 3.3(a)(1). See id. at 954. Could a prosecutor m federal
court charge the defense counsel with "witness tampering" by engaging m
"misleading conduct"" Presumably defense counsel would try to argue that he did
it to get to the truth-that the witness couldn't actually identify the defendant
Nonetheless, the charge or threat of a charge nught be successful m intimdating
counsel. In any event, lawyers exhibit a dangerously cavalier attitude when it
comes to 18 U.S.C. § 1512. See, e.g., Isikoff & Thomas, supra note 139, at 40
("Speaking not for attribution, several white-collar-crime lawyers suggested
that [Vernon] Jordan may have coached Lewmsky in a way that subtly got the
message across without exposing anyone to obstruction-of-justice charges. When
preparing witnesses, a clever lawyer can ask questions that produce answers the
lawyer wants to hear-without ever suggesting that the witness lie.").
161 18 U.S.C. § 1512(d). This exercise in burden shifting has been ruled con-
stitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Clemons, 658 F Supp. 1116, 1125 (W.D. Pa.
1987), afid, 843 F.2d 741 (3d Cir. 1988); Kalevas, 622 F Supp. at 1527 It has
been suggested that this defense was put in to head off "the possibility of ajudge,
prosecutor, or presiding officer violating the statute by threatemng a witness with
a perjury prosecution for false testimony." Judah Best & VirginaWhite-Mahaffey,
An Analysis of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, in CRIMINAL LAW
AND URBAN PROBLEMS 1984, at 89, 98 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook SeriesNo. C4-4168, 1984). Ofcourse, suchwarmngs can go overboard,
and result m the reversal of a conviction if the defendant is deprived of the benefit
of the witness's testimony. See, e.g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95 (1972); United
States v. Risken, 788 F.2d 1361 (8th Cir. 1986).
In terms of excuses, the following quote should be considered: "The payment
of a sum of money to a witness to 'tell the truth' is as clearly subversive of the
proper adminstration of justice as to pay him to testify to what is not true." In re
Robinson, 136 N.Y.S. 548,556 (App. Div. 1912), afld, 103 N.E. 160 (N.Y. 1913).
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hun to shut up." Even worse, your client says "I'm going to kick his
[and show him who's boss]." 162
Hall claims that a California lawyer was indicted under 18 U.S.C. §
1512 "for telling witnesses that they did not have to talk to government
officers without consulting a lawyer.""6 This seems pretty far out, but then
again, indictments are pretty much had by the prosecutor for the asking.' 64
In my own home state of Kentucky, a lawyer was recently suspended from
practice following his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) for
attempting to persuade another person not to testify in official
proceedings. 165 The lawyer also got a fifty-seven month prison sentence! 166
162 Hall, supra note 94, at 332-33. Lawyers in civil cases are also subject to
allegations of misconduct. For an interesting case m point, see Red Ball Interior
Demolition Corp. v. Palmadessa, 908 F Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). In this
classic case of closely-held corporation "squeeze out," involving brother against
brother, allegations were made that plaintiff's counsel should be disqualified for
making allegedly improper payments to a lay witness in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
20 1(d) and for allegedly rmsleading or threatening statements m violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1512(b). The judge demed the motion to disqualify See id. On the issue
of payments to witnesses, see ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-402 (1996).
163 Hall, supra note 94, at 334.
164 It is probably worth noting that a variety of allegations of misconduct of
counsel may be advancedpost conviction. The United States Supreme Court did
lawyers a great disservice when it decided to cut off arguments m direct appeals
through the application of "waiver and by-pass" rules, only to entertain
substantially similar arguments in habeas corpus under the rubric of "ineffective
assistance of counsel." Nowadays, the dissatisfied client (inmate) will almost
certainly attack is former defense lawyer with avariety of creative if not contrived
claims, all with the encouragement of a taxpayer-supported cadre of public
advocates. The latest weapon is the claim that counsel was suspected of
subornation and that counsel therefore was "chilled"-prevented from furmshing
sufficiently zealous advocacy-by threats from the prosecutor or the trial judge.
What fresh hell is this? one maywell ask. Cf Johnston v. Love, No. 95-3727, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21426 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 1995) (detailing convicted murderer's
unsuccessful claims that he should get a new trial because a witness suggested that
defense counsel was accused of subornation by a witness, the judge gave dirty
looks to counsel, and counsel was intimidated, failed to testify to rebut the
witness's testimony, etc.).
65 See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Zeman, 828 S.W.2d 609, 609 (Ky. 1992).
'66 See Zeman v. United States, No. 95-6368, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29444
(6th Cir. Nov. 7, 1996).
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By expressing less than unalloyed enthusiasm for these new federal
criminal laws, I do not want to leave the reader with the impression that
subornation does not take place or that lawyers are harshly or unfairly
treated when they get caught. My point is simply that 18 U.S.C. § 1512
may sweep too broadly and mvite abuse by the prosecution and law
enforcement. The bad cases may end up going unpunished or going lightly
punished while draconian measures are reserved for the trivial or even the
innocent. Of course, some would simply say, "That's the law"
While 18 U.S.C. § 1512, the federal witness tampering statute, applies
only to federal proceedings, 67 state laws have also widened the net. For
example, Kentucky law now punishes some "unswom falsifications" (lies)
intended to "mislead a public servant m the performance of his duty "1 68
The Kentucky statute relates only to certain written statements, false
records or forged instruments, or false samples, specimens, maps, boundary
marks, or the like.169 The statute is not as sweeping as its federal
counterpart 18 U.S.C. § 1001. Section 523.110 of Kentucky's statutes goes
on to make it an offense to give a "peace officer" a false name or address
with "intent to mislead the officer as to [one's] identity," but the offender
must first be warned that giving a false name or address is a crminmal
offense. 7 ° It can be seen that in at least some states legislators are not so
enthusiastic about widening the net (lest they be caught up in it?). On the
other hand, Kentucky is typical to the extent that it has enacted a number
of laws punishing acts amounting to interference with judicial administra-
tion such as witness tampering through bribery, harassment, intimidation,
retaliation, or tampering with physical evidence and the like. 7' As of yet,
however, nothing so sweeping as 18 U.S.C. § 1512 has been proposed.
Il. PROSECUTORS, POLICE PERJURY, AND THE SNITCH PROBLEM
The owner class went cold with fear.
It drew its sharpest knife
Of treachery and perjury,
167 See McKinney v State, 720 F Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1989); Park South
Assocs. v. Fischbem, 626 F Supp. 1108 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir.
1986).
161 KY. REV STAT. ANN. § 523.100 (Michie 1990).
169 See id. § 523.110.
170.1d.
171 See Id. §§ 524.010-.120.
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And Tom was framed for life.17
In Hollywood movies and mystery novels, detectives catch the villains by
skillful deduction and the piecing together of clues. In real life, they
depend on snitches. 173
I suspect that we can all agree that clearer rules will not make all of the
ethical problems go away Luminous boundary lines will not keep the
reckless, the drunk, and the power drunk on the road and in the proper lane.
Bright lines are no more effective than restraining orders m domestic
violence cases. Consider the letter, and then the reality, of the ethical
guidelines for the prosecution.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 74 provide:
3-5.6. Presentation of evidence
(a) A prosecutor should not knowingly offer false evidence, whether by
documents, tangible evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, or fail to
seek withdrawal thereof upon discovery of its falsity 175
In 1935, m the case of Mooney v. Holohan, the Supreme Court of the
United States got around to announcing the obvious:
[Due process] is a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied by
mere notice and hearing if a State has contrived a conviction through the
7'2Mike Qum,Farewell, MotherMooney, quoted in CURT GENTRY, FRAME-UP-
THE INCREDIBLE CASE OF TOM MOONEY AND WARREN BILLINGS 384 (1967).
173 PETE EARLEY, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: DEATH, LIFE AND JUSTICE IN A
SOUTHERN TowN 116 (1995). Regarding the sometimes unsavory part played by
snitches m anti-terrorism cases, see STEVEN GREER, SUPERGRASSES: A STUDY IN
ANTI-TERRORIST LAW ENFORCEMENT IN NORTHEN IRELAND (1995).
74 In praise of the Standards, see John M. Burkoff, Prosecutorial Ethics: The
DutyNot "To Strike FoulBlows, " 53 U. PrIT. L. REV. 271 (1992). The quote m the
title refers to Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), in which the Court
opined that "while [the prosecutor] may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to
strike foul ones." Id. at 88. In DAVID PANNICK, ADVOCATES (1992), Pannick used
the line while alluding to an unreported American case in which defense counsel
appealed his client's conviction on the ground that the prosecuting attorney had
"'farted about 100 times"' during counsel's closing argument. See id. at 51.
175 1 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function, Standard
3-5.6 (1993).
176 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
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pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a
defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by
the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. 177
The case arose from the 1916 San Francisco Preparedness Day
Bombing. One of the six people arrested for the bombing was the
pugnacious labor leader and Socialist, Thomas J. Mooney Among the
witnesses against hun were "a drug addict, a garrulous prostitute, an
ex-convict in need of a favor, and an apparently upright woman who later
said she had witnessed the crime in her 'astral presence. ' '178 John
McDonald, the supposed drug addict, later confessed that he had been
coached to commit perjury by the district attorney himself.179 'My
testimony was untrue and false," said McDonald (somewhat redundantly)
in a public statement issued shortly before he returned to California for a
hearing conducted by the Supreme Court of California. 8"
Another witness, Frank C. Oxman, testified that Mooney and the other
bombers had been at the scene of the crime. It was later discovered,
however, that Oxman was miles from San Francisco when the bomb
exploded.18 ' A famous series of photographs offered by the defense shows
Mooney and ns wife on a roof more than a mile from the blast, with a
clockface in the photo showing the time just a few minutes before the
explosion. The prosecutor had first tried to suppress the photographs but
finally turned over copies that had been blurred deliberately 12 Mooney
was convicted anyway Not even the 1935 Supreme Court opimon would
free him'." His case was sent back to the California courts for factual
findings, and the California courts more or less rehabilitated the perjured
177 Id. at 112.
7 Ed Cray, "It Was Lies, All Lies!", CAL. LAW., Sept. 1983, at 42, 44.
'19 See GENTRY, supra note 172, at 283-84. Even after he had confessed to
perjury, he indignantly insisted that he was not a drug addict.
18o Crime: California's Witness, TIME, July 21, 1930, at 19.
.8. See Cray, supra note 178, at 44; GENTRY, supra note 172, at 286-87 The
title of Cray's article comes from the mouth of McDonald based on words
spoken by him during his testimony before the Supreme Court of California. See
id. at 340. The trial judge in the Mooney case once declared that the case was "one
of the dirtiestjobs ever put over." Crime: California's Witness, supra note 180, at
19. The foreman of the jury said that the jurors' decision had turned on the
testimony of McDonald and Oxman, both of whom he now considered discredited.
See id.
"' See GENTRY, supra note 172, at 161.
183 See Mooney v Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
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witnesses and covered up for them.8 4 It was not until 1939 that Mooney
was pardoned. By then he had become an "international folk hero."'8 5
Where there is knowing use of perjured testimony, there is usually a
quidpro quo. Again, the ABA Standards provide rules just waiting to be
broken.
3-3.2. Relations with victims and prospective witnesses
(a) A prosecutor should not compensate a witness, other than an expert,
for giving testimony 186
Leave aside the question of what is or is not "prohibited compensa-
tion." We will deal with that when we come to the subject of jailhouse
informers and "snitches." For now, consider this much: if the inducement
is improper, or if there is strong inpeachmg, contradictory, or other
exculpatory evidence, then the crooked prosecutor will attempt to keep the
defense in the dark regarding same. Again, the Standards have lots to say
about this:
3-3.11. Disclosure of evidence by the prosecutor
(a) A prosecutor should not intentionally fail to make timely disclosure to
the defense, at the earliest feasible opportunity, of the existence of all
'
84 See In re Mooney, 73 P.2d 554, 558 (Cal. 1937). In early August 1930, the
Supreme Court of California had sat as an advisory pardon board and had heard the
new testimony of McDonald and others. It was reported that Justice Preston, a
former district attorney, served as a sort of prosecutor and cross-examined
McDonald with "ferocity." "Was [your earlier testimony] a lie? Weren't you
lying when you said that? You've told five different stones at five different
times. How is the court to know wich one to believe?" Radicals Retired, TIME,
Aug. 11, 1930, at 18. In the view of thejustices, McDonald was such a liar that his
admission of perjury could not be believed!
"I5 Cray, supra note 178, at 42. Throughout, the villain of the piece was Charles
Marron Fickert. It may be of interest to the reader that Mooney once described Earl
Warren as "the Fickert of 1936-37 "GENTRY, supra note 172, at 414. For his part,
when Warren was electedAttorney General ofCaliforma, he "express[ed] the hope
that if the governor did decide to free Mooney he would not designate him the
victim of a frame-up." Id. at 419. Governor Olson did just that, and Warren "took
his anger out on [Mooney's confederate,] the hapless Billings" by voting with the
majority of the Pardon Advisory Board to keep Billings m jail. ED CRAY, CHIEF
JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 107 (1997).
186 1 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function, Standard
3-3.2 (1993).
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evidence or information which tends to negate the guilt of the accused or
mitigate the offense charged or which would tend to reduce the punish-
ment of the accused.
(c) A prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence
because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the
accused.
187
It is now acknowledged that a prosecutor's failure to disclose such
exculpatory evidence can deprive a defendant of constitutional due process
of law,188 and clauns ofnondisclosure or suppression of material evidence
have kept cases m the public eye for years. 189
187 Id. Standard 3-3.11.
8 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-88 (1963). It is true that Brady had
not yet been decided when prosecutors withheld exculpatory evidence from Dr.
Sam Sheppard's defense lawyers, see CYNTHIA L. COOPER & SAM REESE
SHEPPARD, MOCKERY OF JUSTICE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE SAM SHEPPARD
MURDER CASE 83 (1995), but the notions offaitiess announced in Brady are much
older than either Sheppard's or Brady's cases. Cf United States v. Burr, 25 F Cas.
30 (D. Va. 1807). In 1942, long before the murder of Dr. Sheppard's wife, the
Supreme Court decided Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942), wherein Justice
Murphy opined that the "inexpertly drawn" papers submitted by the prisoner
alleged that "his impnsonment resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used
by the State authorities to obtain his conviction, and from the deliberate
suppression by those same authorities of evidence favorable to hun." Id. at 215. If
the prisoner could prove this, he must be set free. Note that where there is knowing
use of perjured testimony, there will also be suppression of evidence-the two
necessarily go hand in hand, and a link to other specific constitutional guarantees
such as confrontation and compulsory process have been suggested. See generally
Jean Montoya, A Theory of Compulsory Process Clause Discovery Rights, 70 IND.
L.J. 845 (1995).
ABA Model Rule 3.8 provides that "[tihe prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known
to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the
offense "MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 (1998). The
older ABA Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) was similar. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103 (1983).
"'9 Alleged "failure to disclose" temporarily resurrected the infamous Wayne
Williams--Atlanta Child Murder" case. See Mark Cumden, The Case That Shook
Atlanta RisesAgain, NAT'LL.J., Jan. 17, 1994, at 8. And in 1992, Alan Dershowitz
attempted to obtain a new trial for Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald, who had been convicted
in the "Green Beret Fatal Vision" murders of his wife and two daughters.
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No less an authority on courtroom etiquette than Britain's Barrister
Richard Du Cann has held forth that
prosecuting counsel should be: "An officer of Justice. He must present the
case against the defendant relentlessly, but with scrupulous fairness."
Translated, this might read: "he must prosecute and not persecute."
In practice it means he must present all the facts to the court whether they
are favourable or unfavourable to the case he is instructed to put forward.
If he has in his possession statements from witnesses whom he does not
intend to call who might give relevant evidence for the defence, then the
defence must be furnished with the names and addresses of those
MacDonald claimed that his family had been slaughtered by drug-crazed hippies,
one of whom (a female) had long blond hair. Dershowitz claimed that blond wig
hairs and some dark wig fibers found in Mrs. MacDonald's hairbrush had not been
provided to the defense by the prosecution and that they might have led thejury to
believe MacDonald's story if they had been offered m evidence. In rebuttal, FBI
expert witnesses provided affidavits that the hair and fibers in question were very
much like Barbie doll hair and that the dark fibers could be matched to a wig
owned by Mrs. MacDonald. MacDonald's attempt to secure a new trial failed. See
DAVID FISHER, HARD EVIDENCE 112-13 (1995) (recounting the FBI version of the
story). In the spring of 1997, following the release of a Justice Department report
critical of the FBI Crime Lab, new evidence surfaced that caused many to question
the accuracy and credibility of the information supplied by the FBI fiber expert in
the MacDonald case. The particular agent was described as being notorious for
providing prosecutors with unequivocal conclusions without sufficient supporting
evidence. In another case involving the impeachment of U.S. District Judge Alcee
Hastings, the same expert had been charged by a colleague with having given false
and misleading testimony (the particular testimony did not involve fiber evidence).
See Laurie P Cohen, Strand ofEvidence; FBI Crime-Lab Work Emerges as New
Issue in Famed Murder Case; Jeffiey MacDonald's Lawyer Alleges Fraud by
Agent with History ofProblems; Mystery ofthe BlondFibers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16,
1997, at Al. In the MacDonald case, at least two disinterested industry witnesses
came forward and disclosed that FBI agents had pressed them to sign affidavits that
did not reflect the true facts about the use of synthetic fibers in doll and wig
manufacture. See id. For more on the FBI Crime Lab report, see Gary Fields &
Kevin Johnson, Report Confirms FBI Lab Flaws; Challenges to Verdicts Now
Expected, USA TODAY, Apr. 16,1997, at 1A, andB.J Palermo, DefenseBarAngry
Over Lab Scandal, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 10, 1997, at Al. Of course, the problems of
false evidence at the FBI are not umque. See Gary Taylor, Fake Evidence Becomes
RealProblem, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9, 1995, atAl; Richard H. Underwood, "X-Spurt"
Witnesses, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 343 (1995) [hereinafter Underwood, 'X-
Spurt" Witnesses].
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witnesses. If he knows that a witness on whom he is relying to prove his
case is of bad character, the defence must be given the details of Ins
convictions. Ifhe hears one of lus witnesses giving evidence which differs
from a statement which he has in his possession his duty is to hand that
statement to the defence or to the Judge so that the witness may be
cross-examined on it.
190
This is all very right and proper, but in the United States, at least, the
rules are one thing and what the prosecutors actually do is another thmg.
190 RICHARDDUCANN, THEARTOFTHEADVOCATE 38 (1964).AnnexeHofthe
CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES is m accord, and states
in pertinent part that:
1.1 Prosecuting counsel should not attempt to obtain a conviction by all
means at his command. He should not regard himself as appearing for a
party
1.2 Prosecuting counsel should bear m mmd that it is his duty to
ensure that all relevant evidence is either presented by the prosecution or
made available to the defence.
CODE OF CONDUCT OF THE BAR OF ENGLAND AND WALES, Annexe H: Written
Standards for the Conduct of Professional Work, Standards Applicable to Criminal
Cases paras. 1.1, 1.2.
191 See, e.g., Daniel Klaidman, Prosecutor Faces Ouster; In Rare Rebuke,
Former Head ofA USA Group Suspended for Misconduct, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2,
1995, at 1. For a recent case of some notoriety, see Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10
F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 1993), m which prosecutors failed to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the courts and to the detainee, an alleged Nazi war criminal, resulting
in his extradition to Israel on a capital charge of which he was ultimately acquitted.
For examples of less publicized, almost "routine" violations, see United States v.
Brumel-Alvarez, 991 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1992) (discussing government's
withholding of a memorandum undermining witness's credibility), and United
States v. Rivera Pedin, 861 F.2d 1522 (1 1th Cir. 1988) (discussing prosecutor's
failure to make disclosure of Jenks Act material and to correct testimony known to
be false).
Only this year, previously "suppressed" blood and semen samples yieldedDNA
results strongly suggesting that convicted murderer Richard Eberling may have
been the killer of Marilyn Sheppard, wife of Dr. Sam Sheppard. Prosecutorial
misconduct figured into the accounting of the Dr. Sheppard murder trials. See
COOPER& SHEPPARD, supra note 188, at 83-84. The "newly discovered" scientific
evidence supports their argument that evidence of rape and leads pomting in
Eberling's direction may have been ignored at the direction of the prosecution.
Eberling had washed the windows at the Sheppard estate. See Fox Butterfield, New
Clues in an OldMurder Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1997, at A12.
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People v. Ramos provides a shocking taste of reality. Alberto Ramos
was a twenty-two-year-old student a~nd part-time teacher's aide when he
was charged and convicted of raping a five-year-old girl in the restroom of
a day-care center.193 According to the reported opinion in the case, the
victim, who was six years old at the time of the trial, did not identify
Ramos in court but managed to describe the alleged incident through the
use of anatomically correct dolls' 94 (a sort of "poppet" popular among
social workers 95). She had originally stated that one ofthe little boys in the
class had been the one who had done something wrong, but this was
explained away There was virtually no corroboration for the child's story
It was not supported by other teacher's aides who were on duty at the day-
care center. Indeed, Ramos had been left alone with the child for no more
than fifteen mnutes.' 96 Medical evidence indicated that there was some
bruismg in the vaginal area and some slight stretching of the hymen, but
there were also references in the medical records (which were not
introduced into evidence) that the child had told the hospital personnel that
an older boy or boys (she named the same child that she had previously
named) were responsible.1 97 A doctor was permitted to testify despite
objection that she was able to conclude that "the child had possibly been
sexually abused [because of] the fact that the child was able to give 'such
an accurate description of everything that happened.' While this
statement, implying that the child had made an accusation, was admitted
into evidence, the content of the accusation was not."'198
People v. Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d 977 (App. Div. 1994).
'
93 See id. at 978.
'9 See id.
195 Fans ofArthurMiller's play, The Crucible, willrecall that the false witnesses
m the Salem witch trial of Elizabeth Proctor accused her of concealing "poppets,"
the Puritan version of voodoo dolls, m her house. Unfortunately, the prosecuting
witnesses were the one's consorting with the devil. See ARTHUR MILLER, THE
CRUCIBLE 237-38, 278-79,299-300, repnnted in ARTHuR MILLER'S COLLECTED
PLAYS 225 (Viking Press 1957).
196 See Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 978.
197 See id. at 979.
9I Id. at 979-80. The appellate court observed parenthetically,
While not before us on this motion, the propriety of admitting such
testimony may be questioned m light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Idaho v. Wright, holding that an expert may not repeat a child's hearsay
accusation without an initial determination as to whether the expert
conducted the interview with the child in a way that was not unduly
suggestive.
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Ramos was convicted and sentenced to eight and one-third to twenty-
five years in prison.' He had served over seven years of tis sentence
when he received some astounding documents -from a private investigator
who had worked for the day-care center in the defense of a parallel civil
suit for money damages brought by the child's parents. That case had
apparently been settled, but the investigator had been convinced of
Ramos's innocence.2" In the materials providedto Ramos by the investiga-
tor were facts winch were known to and withheld by the prosecutor in
Ramos's criminal case. Tins withheld evidence showed that, prior to the
alleged abuse, the child was known to "masturbate openly at school [and]
expos[e] herself to other[s]; '210 that the child had been seen imitating
sexual intercourse using dolls; and that she had been in the habit of
watching late mght "HBO movies" and describing the "sexual things she
sees." 202 Numerous witness statements that were exculpatory or contra-
dicted evidence offered at the trial were kept from Ramos's defense
lawyers. Since "[t]he crux of the defense at trial [had been] that the entire
incident never occurred and that the child's testimony was simply false,
either deliberately or because she had come to believe it herself by having
been subjected to repeated suggestive mquiry," 3 the evidence suppressed
by the.prosecutor could not have been more critical. Ramos was set free.
Id. at 980 (citation omitted). For a superb new review of the scientific literature on
children's testimony, see STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE
COURTROOM: A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN'S TESTIMONY (1995).
'99 See Ramos, 614 N.Y.S.2d at 980.
200 See id.
2 11 Id. at 981.
202 Id
203 Id. at 983. The reality of this case might profitably be compared to the many
assumptions made by the treatise writers and rule-makers regarding the psychology
and testimony of children. For example, here are some generalizations taken from
a new handbook on the law of evidence:
Even older children, particularly if they are victims of sexual or physical
abuse, may have difficulty testifying in open court in the presence of their
abuser. In recent years a variety of procedures and devices have been
adopted to facilitate testimony by children, including the use of anatomical
dolls to help overcome verbal inhibitions in describing sexual activity and
liberalized rules allowing the child's parent or other trusted person to sit
near the child and provide support while she is testifying.
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 6.2, at 505
(1995) (footnotes omitted). In a recent case in western Kentucky, a child of tender
years was the complaining witness in a sexual assault case. She testified that her
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There is little point in holding forth at much length on the problem of
police perjury That some police officers will perjure themselves to get a
conviction or protect themselves is an "open secret,"2" although many
judges still piously instruct jurors that "the officer has no reason to lie."
Tins is an absurd and repellant mantra, but as long as lawyers tolerate it, it
is unlikely that appellate judges will strike it from the script. One suspects
(admittedly, I am guessing) that direct police perjury-m which the officers
themselves he-takes place mostly in run-of-the-mill cases (traffic andDUI)
or m response to motions to suppress evidence (in support of warrants or
in justification of warrantless searches-exigent circumstances and all
that).20 5 The perjured cop of today is but an updated version of Arthur
Train's Officer Delany-
He had never been called upon to swear away an innocent man's liberty,
but more than once he had had to stand for a frame-up against a guilty
one. That phantasmagorical scintilla of evidence needed to bolster up
a weak or doubtful case could always be counted on if Delany was the
officer who had made the arrest. None of his cases were ever thrown out
assailant had a mole and freckles on Ins pems. Her testimony was extremely
graphic and reportedly very believable-it must be true! The defense lawyer
prevailed upon the court to allow the defendant to put himself on display (it seems
that a private(s) viewing by the judge followed by a stipulation-"no mole and no
freckles on this bad boy'-would have been just as effective and certainly more
decorous). Defendant was acquitted. I am not making tlus up. See Robin Divine,
Officials Review Caldwell Trial Nudity, PADUCAH SUN (Paducah, Ky.), June 18,
1995, at 1A. I am quoted for the brilliant statement--I've never been in that
position." 1d. One cannot help but speculate on what might have happened in the
case of Paula Corbin Jones v. William Jefferson Clinton, see Complaint para. 22,
Jones v. Clinton, 990 F Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998) (No. LR-C-94-290) (referring
to "distinguishing characteristics m Clinton's genital area"), had the case not been
thrown out of court m April 1998. See Jones v. Clinton, 990 F Supp. 657, 662
(E.D. Ark. 1998).
204 Fred Cohen, Police Perjury: An Interview With Martin Garbus, 8 CRiM. L.
BULL. 363, 363 (1972). For an interesting case in which several law enforcement
officers were convicted of criminal violations of the Civil Rights Act (18 U.S.C.
§ 242 (1997)) and for witness tampering (18 U.S.C. § 1512 (1994 & Supp. H
1997)), see United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1990).
205 See Irving Younger, The Perjury Routine, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 551 (1967).
Younger discusses "dropsy testimony" (the defendant dropped the evidence, so
there was no unlawful search and seizure) and systematic lying about defendants
who convemently provide confessions in the form of spontaneous and voluntary
apologies. See id. at 552.
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of court for lack of evidence, but then, Delaney never arrested anybody
who wasn't guilty1
206
Although mundane, motions to suppress are made in some pretty
sensational cases. The notorious O.3. Simpson case had hardly started
before the commentators and pundits were psychoanalyzing the investiga-
tive officers and suggesting that they fudged m order to justify their
searches of the Simpson prenses. Professor Alan Dershowitz, one of the
defense "dream team," made the sensational charge (which sounded more
and more plausible as the case unfolded) that the Los Angeles Police
Department taught its officers the art of "testilying."207 One law review
article made much of a detective's demeanor, or body language, as he
testified at the suppression hearing.2 8 Not everyone jumped on the
police-bashing bandwagon, but the accusations struck a nerve. Later they
would become body blows and land hard.3°9
206 ARTHUR TRAIN, BY ADVICE OF COUNSEL 5 (1928).
207 Dershowitz has expressed Is views on police perjury in his many writ-
ings. See, e.g., DERSHOWITZ, supra note 95, at 68-69. "Testilymg" has been the
subject of complaint m conservative as well as liberal circles. See, e.g., Robert
Bauman, Exclusive Justice, REASON, May 1995, at 48-50. Bauman, a Republican
Congressman from Florida from 1973 to 1981, reports widespread abuse mBoston,
New York, New Orleans, and Los Angeles. For the latest reported outbreak m the
"Big Apple," see Pockets of Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1995, at 43; George
James, Judge Dismisses Case Against Police Officer- 'Slaps, Kicks' Are Not
Assault, She Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1995, at 27; Robert D. McFadden, Three
More in Precinct Are Accused: Sergeant and 2 Officers Charged with PerJury,
N.Y TIMES, Apr. 7, 1995, at B1, George James, Police in an Informer Program
Are Investigated Themselves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1995, at B3; and Clifford
Krauss, 3 From Queens Precinct Indicted in Theft of $1,400 from Man, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1995, at B3.
20 See Morgan Cloud, The Dirty Little Secret, 43 EMORY L.J. 1311, 1336-39
(1994). For a more recent contribution, see Christopher Slobogm, Testilying:
Police PerJury and What To Do About It, 67 U. COLO. L. REV 1037 (1996).
209 For the theory that the O.3. case involved an effort to frame a guilty man, see
Eric Zorn, Maybe O.J. Did It and the Cops Tried To Frame Him Too, CHI. TRIB.,
Feb. 6, 1997, § 2 (Metro Chicago), at 1. In this piece, the author states that "studies
have shown that [in Cook County] just over three-quarters of police officers say
they think their colleagues 'shade the facts a little or a lot to establish probable
cause' for searches." Id. One former public defender and Assistant U.S. Attorney
is quoted as saying:
Somewhere, a police officer is speaking to a young prosecutor and he's
shading the truth. Or he's lying. And the prosecutor is in the process of
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The Simpson case is, after all, only one case. Put it aside. There is still
plenty of evidence that police perjury is not confined to fencing matches
over legal technicalities. Police officers can, and sometimes do, write false
and misleading reports. They commonly suppress exculpatory evidence by
deleting it from their reports.21 0 Some critics charge that the abuse is
systematic m some departments. One of the most notorious cases of this
genre is Jones v. City of Chicago."' The case arose from the rape and
murder of a twelve-year-old girl. The perpetrator had also beaten her ten-
year-old brother. However, the semi-comatose brother indicated to
detectives that the killer was a light-skinned African-Amencan gang
member named George who lived in the neighborhood." One detective,
Frank Laverty, suspected that the bad guy was probably a gang member
who went by the nickname of "King George" and was lighter skinned than
the complaining witness.213 This theory fit the facts. He ultimately
making a decision. "Do I call him a liar?" he's thinking. "Or do I go ahead
and let the judge or the jury decide?"
Id.
210 See Stanley Z. Fisher, "Just the Facts Ma "am" Lying and the Omission of
Exculpatory Evidence in Police Reports, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV 1 (1993). For a
small town perspective, see EARLEY, supra note 173. There are othervariations on
this theme. Professor Weinberg reports that police in the U.S. routinely "smooth
reports" for the file and destroy their original notes. Sometimes they are
encouraged to do this by prosecutors. SeeA Panel Discussion, supra note 128, at
875. Other panelists suggested that tis would be viewed as unethical mthe English
system.
211 Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1988); see also Palmer v.
City of Chicago, 755 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1985). Both cases are discussed in Fisher,
supra note 210, at 42. Palmer was a class-action lawsuit that challenged the
Chicago Police Department's so-called "double file system." Palmer, 755 F.2d at
565. Under this system, any exculpatory evidence is gathered and preserved in a
"street file" that is never made available to the defense. See id. at 565-66. Can it be
that prosecutors do not know about this system? If they do, then so much forBrady
v. Maryland, so much for the ABA Standard 3-3.1 l(a), Model Rule 3.8(d), DR 7-
103(B), and so much for good faith in discovery. Fisher citesPeople v. Young, 591
N.E.2d 1163, 1165 (N.Y. 1992), and reports that prosecutors in New York only
recently discovered that a similar system of"unofficial" or "confidential" files were
kept by the N.Y.P.D. These files were "intra-departmental" and were kept from the
prosecutors. Fisher, supra note 210, at 36 n.179. Obviously, defense lawyers are
going to have to start pressing for the turnover of all files, "official" and
"unofficial."212 See Jones, 856 F.2d at 988.
213 See id. at 991.
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determined that two men, one of them being "King George," had probably
done the crime. The "King" even confessed to a similar rape and murder
that had been committed in the same area.214 Alas, this detective was
not kept on the case.21 5 The folks that were kept on the case had it m
their heads that the crime should be pinned on George Jones, the dark
skinned, studious editor of the Fenger High School student newspaper
and the son of a Chicago policeman. The beating victim was inter-
viewed several times and pressed m a suggestive manner to identify
Jones's photograph and finger him as the assailant. The witness's
responses were confused at best.2O 16 No matter. The investigators got an
indictment and, in the meantime, prepared an "official" report (inconve-
ment, exculpatory evidence was Idden away in a separate, secret "street
file") that Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner (the conservative law
and economics guy who is not exactly known as "the felon's
friend") later described as "full of falsehoods."2 7 It falsely stated that
witnesses had picked Jones's picture from a group or array of photos (only
Jones's picture was displayed), that Jones's father had not seen him on
the morning of the crime (the father had said just the opposite), and that
the ailing star witness had said that his assailant was a Fenger High
student (he had told the detectives nothing of the land). The report
also omitted such exculpatory facts as the original description of a
"light-skinned George" and warnings by the victim-witness's doctors
that Ins head mjunes left him with a questionable memory218 Jones
found himself on trial, facing the death penalty, and thoroughly
identified by confused witnesses. Fortunately, Detective Laverty learned
what was going on and came to the rescue. Laverty told Jones's lawyer
about the information in the "street file."219 It also came to the judge's
attention that Laverty had even been threatened by the detectives in charge
of the case-one was going to "blow him away" if he messed up their
case.?0 A mistrial was declared, and the prosecution dropped charges
against Jones. 22
214 See id.
215 See id. at 990-91.
216 See id. at 988-90.
217 Id. at 990.
218 See id.
219 See id. at 991.
220 Id.
2' See id.
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The really spectacular cases ofperjurythat have surfaced of latem have
involved the use of "turncoats" (potential codefendants turned state's
evidence), "stool pigeons" (decoys and informants set up by the police),
and "snitches" (police informants, particularly jailhouse informants). m
Their use in law enforcement and their depredations are well documented
in the case law2 4 and in the professional literature.'
Randall Adams may be this generation's most celebrated victim of
prosecutorial deal-making. He was convicted and sentencedto death for the
killing of Dallas police officer Robert Wood. Dr. Grigson-the infamous Dr.
Death-testifiedthatAdanswouldkill again. As an "expert," hewas certain
of it. 26 But David Harrs, the key witness against Adams, surely committed
the murder. Iromcally, but not surprisingly, it was he, the state's witness,
who would kill again before the truth set Randall Adams free. Critics of the
prosecution contend that the prosecutor knew or should have known that
Hams's testimony was false, that he was the real killer, and that "some of
the crucial prosecution documents which showed perjury and suppression
2It is hard to keep up. See Mark Hansen, How a Vision Failed: Indictment
Calls Prosecution a Conspiracy Against Suspect, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1997, at 26
(reporting the indictment of three Chicago-area prosecutors for offenses ranging
from obstruction of justice to concealment of evidence and presentation of false
evidence); David E. Rovella, Prisoner Released After Judge Finds Frame-Up,
NAT'L L.J., May 5, 1997, at A7 (reporting on the Pennsylvania trial of Lambert v.
Blackwell, No. 96-6244 (Apr. 21, 1996), m which the U.S. District Judge released
a state convict and made a"referral" of sorts to the United States Attorney, alluding
to a possible prosecution of the state prosecutor). Hopefully everyone understands
that there is nothing new under the sun. The lethal combination of perjury,
prosecutorial msconduct, and abuse of"scientific" expert testimony accounted for
the conviction of lawyer Albert T. Patrick for the murder of millionaire William
Marsh Rice, of Rice Umversity fame, in 1902. It seems that everyone who was
anyone had some connection with the case. See MARTIN L. FRIEDLAND, THE
DEATH OF OLD MAN RICE: A TRUE STORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA
(1994). Fnedland mentions along the way such luminaries as Mark Twain, Sir
Arthur Conan Doyle, Francis Wellman, Arthur Train, William Randolph Hearst,
Charles Evans Hughes, Grover Cleveland, and casts as a possible villain, the
erstwhile illustrious James A. Baker of Baker & Botts! See id.
I2 I may be misusing the lingo. No doubt these terms have specific, scientific
meanings.
22 See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
See, e.g., Mark Currden, No HonorAmong Thzeves, A.B.A. J., June 1989,
at 52 [hereinafter Curnden, No Honor].
226 On Grigson and like "X-Spurts," see Underwood, "'-Spurt" Witnesses,
supra note 189, at 343.
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of exculpatory evidence" were only discovered because of the efforts of
movie-maker Errol Moms, who told the story in The Thin Blue Line.27
Other less highly publicized cases of tis genre include Brown v. Wain-
wright 2 1 and McMillian v. State. 922
Brown was convicted of the murder, rape, and robbery of Earlene
Barksdale, who was the co-owner of a small shop and the wife of a well-
known Tampa lawyer. 3 Brown was sentenced to death and was only
seventeen hours from execution before his lawyer was able to persuade
authorities that Ins conviction had been based on perjured testimony 2 1
The scenario was all too typical of criminal cases these days. The
evening of the Barksdale murder, a man and a woman were robbed at a
motel. The following day, Brown turned himself in and confessed that he
had been a participant, along with Ronald Floyd, and gave the police some
information that enabled them to locate the gun, belonging to Raymond
Vinson, that was used in the robbery All three were charged m the motel
robbery 12 When Floyd and Vinson were taken into custody and learned
that Brown had named them, they turned on him, and, quite naturally,
started thinking of ways to save themselves. They fingered Brown for the
murder of Barksdale, which had been committed earlier the same day 23
With this as background, zip ahead through space and time to Brown's
trial. Floyd was presented by the prosecutor as the only witness who could
place Brown at the scene of the Barksdale murder. He testified that he,
227 THE THIN BLUE LINE (H.B.O. 1988). The story is now told m RANDALL
DALE ADAMS ETAL., ADAMs v TEXAS (1991). See also the discussion in the brief
filed by Professor Eric Freedman and attorney Harold Tyler in Schiup v. Delo, 513
U.S. 298 (1995), reprnted in Verbatim: Former Death-Row Inmates Speak Out,
LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 3, 1994, at 15. Prior to Schlup, the law (the so-called
"miscamage of justice" doctrine) was that a petitioner in habeas corpus had to
show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no
reasonable juror would have found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty. On
January 23, 1995, a five-to-four majority of the Supreme Court ruled that the
habeas corpus petitioner who had been sentenced to death need only show that a
constitutional violation "'probably resulted"' m the conviction of one who was
actually innocent. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326-27
n8 Brown v. Wainwright, 785 F.2d 1457 (1 1th Cir. 1986).
229 McMillian v State, 616 So. 2d 933 (Ala. Cnm. App. 1993).
20 See Verbatim, supra note 227, at 15; Curlden, No Honor, supra note 225,
at 55-56.
231 See Curriden, No Honor, supra note 225, at 56.
232 See Brown, 785 F.2d at 1459.
231 See id.
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Brown, and a never-identified player by the name of "Poochie" rode in
Vinson's car to the Barksdale shop. He, Floyd, waited in the car, while
Brown and Poochie went in. He did not know, he said, that Brown was
armed with Vinson's gun. After fifteen minutes had passed, he heard a shot
and went to the door of the shop. Poocle and Brown emerged with some
merchandise, and they all piled in the car and drove away " Poochie said
to Brown, "Man, you didn't have to do that."' 35 Vinson testified as to an
admission made to him by Brown, and Floyd testified to Brown's outright
confession of the murder, made the next day 6 This, in essence, was the
direct testimony that constituted the case against Brown. The defense
lawyer rose to cross-examine Floyd in the style of all graduates of
NITA37--that is, in the generally accepted manner. He brought out the
witness's prior criminal record and the possibility that he could be seeking
revenge from Brown for ns having inplicated Floyd in the motel
robbery231 Then he went into the matter of the witness's interest in the
outcome of Brown's prosecution.
Q In this [motel] robbery, have you been sentenced?
A No, I have not.
Q You have not been sentenced?
A No.
Q When did you plead to it?
A October.
Q Of 19739
A Yes.
Q Do you have any knowledge of why you haven't been sentenced in tus
case?
A No, I haven't. Just that I have been put on PSI.
Q PSI?
A Yes, presentence.
Q What does that stand for9
A Presentence investigation.
Then, with respect to the Barksdale case:
Q Right. Has the State made any promises or agreements with you in this
case?
' See id.
23 Id.
23 See id.
17 National Institute for Trial Advocacy, a.k.a. "The Cartel."
2" See Brown, 785 F.2d at 1459.
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A Not to my knowledge they haven't.
Q They haven't?
A No.
Q Have you been charged with tlus case?
A No, I haven't.
Q Have you been given immunity in this crime?
A No, I have not, not as I know of.
Q You haven't been charged and you haven't been given nrmunity9
A Not as I know of.
Q Are you afraid that you might be charged with this crime?
A Yes, I am.
Q Tlus is a first degree murder trial-
A Yes, I know that.
Q -isn't it? And you are absolutely certain that you haven't been given
any immunity, is that correct?
A I'm certain.
And later:
Q Has the state promised you anything in the sentencing in [the motel]
case if you cooperated in this case?
A Well, like I told you before, I do not have any knowledge of it
whatsoever.
Q Do you think it might be beneficial to you to testify m this case?
A I don't know.
And still later, with respect to the Barksdale case:
Q And, so, you've decided to just cleanse your soul and take the chances
of whether the State of Florida is going to charge you with this murder 9
A Yes.
239
Floyd's testimony was critical. The ballistics evidence was mconclu-
sive. There was no fingerprint evidence. For all practical purposes, Floyd
was the whole case against Brown.24 The prosecutor knew this, and m hIs
closing argument to the jury, he emphasized the "fact" that no deals had
been made with Floyd to bolster his testimony- "And I submit that there has
[sic] been no promises made to Ronald Floyd for his testifying in this
case.
,241
The truth was that there had been a plea agreement in the motel robbery
case. It was true that Floyd had not been sentenced, but he and Brown had
239 Id. at 1459-60.240 See id. at 1460.
241Id. at 1460.
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pled guilty.242 After the Barksdale trial, Floyd was given probation, and
Brown was given twenty years.243 The jury should have known about the
agreement. Tis was not the half of it, however, for Floyd's testimony
about agreements in connection with the Barksdale case was false. The
prosecution knew it was false, let him lie, and exploited the lie in closing
argument. 24
4
Eight months after the trial, Floyd (he was in prison serving a sentence
for yet another robbery') gave Brown's attorney an affidavit retracting his
Barksdale testimony and admitting that it had been exchanged for
"favorable consideration 245 in the motel robbery and Barksdale murder
cases. He repeated this before the trial court. Indeed, the state proffered
evidence indicating that there had been an agreement, admittedly upon
certain conditions, not to prosecute Floyd for the Barksdale murder.24 On
habeas corpus, the Eleventh Circuit thundered:
This case does not involve mere nondisclosure of impeaching evidence
but knowing introduction of false testimony and exploitation of that
testimony m argument to the jury.
The government has a duty not to present or use false testimony.
It did use false testimony. If false testimony surfaces during a trial and the
government has knowledge of it, as occurred here, the government has a
duty to step forward and disclose. Here the government told the jury
"there has been no promises [sic] made to Ronald Floyd for his testifyimg
in this case" when it knew the contrary was true.247
The McMillian 8 case followed the same pattern. McMillian and
Myers were jointly indicted for capital murder and robbery m connection
242 See id. at 1461.
2 3 See id. Brown's conviction was affirmed in Brown v. State, 381 So. 2d 690
(Fla. 1980).
' See id. This is a common pattern. See the discussion of the Jimerson case in
David Protess & Rob Warden, Nine Lives: The Justice System Sentenced These
Men to Death. The Justice System Ultimately Set Them Free. Is That Justice?, CHI.
TRIB., Aug. 10, 1997, Magazine, at 20. "[P]rosecutors did not disclose the
deal-and failed to correct [the witness's] perjury when she denied any deal
existed." Id.
245 Brown, 785 F.2d at 1461.
246 See id. at 1461-62.
247 Id. at 1464 (citations omitted).
24 McMillian v. State, 594 So. 2d 1253 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991).
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with the killing of Ronda Morison, who worked at a dry cleaners. Their
cases were severed, and Myers testified against McMillian. Myers was
white. McMillian was black. McMillian was convicted and sentenced to
death. The Alabama Court of Crminal Appealsremanded to the trial court
for findings on the question of whether any witnesses had been offered
inducements or consideration for their testimony. Satisfied that all was in
order, the appellate court affirmed the death sentence.249 Five months after
the trial, Myers pled guilty to a lesser included offense, but because he was
a habitual offender, he still got thirty years. He then recanted his trial
testimony and told McMillian's attorney that he "knew nothing about the
crime, that he was not been present when the crime was committed, that he
had been told what to say by certain law enforcement officers, and that he
had testified falsely against McMillian because of pressure from the
[police] officers."' 0 As in Brown's case, the defense had relied on an alibi
and had attempted to attack the credibility of the stool pigeon. The
defendant did not testify Myers's testimony had been critical.
The matter took another trip through the Alabama courts as McMillian
sought post-conviction relief. The trial court surveyed the evidence and
expressed the sort of skepticism expressed by the California high court in
the Mooney"s case. 2 "Clearly, Ralph Myers has either perjured himself
at trial or has perjured himself in front of this court."1s Was he lying then,
or is he lying now9 Who can believe a liar? So where does that leave the
convicted person? The trial court concluded that Myers had not perjured
himself at the trial, and the appellate court would not reverse on that issue
alone.25 4
249 See id.
0 McMillian v State, 616 So. 2d 933, 935 (Ala. Cnm. App. 1993).
In re Mooney, 73 P.2d 554 (Cal. 1937); see supra text accompanying notes
176-84 and accompanying text.2 ee McMillian, 616 So. 2d at 936.
253 Id. at 940.
" See id. at 941. For a discussion of the legal issues as well as a very in-
teresting factual account of the infamous case of People v. Dotson, 424 N.E.2d
1319 (1981), affd, 516 N.E.2d 718 (111. App. Ct. 1987), see Margaret Frossard,
When the Accuser Recants: People v. Dotson, LITIG., Summer 1988, at 11. This
case captured the imagination of the public in March 1985 when NBC's Today
show produced Cathleen Crowell-Webb, who told the TV audience that her
testimony against convicted rapist Gary Dotson in 1979 had been a lie. Ms.
Frossard was the lawyer for the State of Illinois who fought Dotson's efforts to
obtain a release following Crowell-Webb's "recantation." See id.
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Fortunately, McMillian's new lawyer was shooting with both barrels.
The prosecutor had failed to produce certain tape-recorded statements
given to the police by Myers and by one Isaac Dailey The prosecution had
also suppressed a police report and certain medical records. The Myers
statements were both exculpatory of McMillian and impeaching of Myers.
They would have undermined the prosecutor's closing argument to the
jury, in which the prosecutor insistedthat Myers was believable because he
had told the same story from the beginning. In fact, he had not.255
The Dailey statement related to another killing. Myers had originally
been arrested for the murder of another person, Vicky Pittman. However,
he was questioned about both the Pittman and Momson killings. Issac
Dailey had also been arrested m connection with the Pittman slaying.
Dailey told a state investigator working on both cases that "while he and
Myers were incarcerated m the jail, he overheard Myers say, in the
presence of other persons whom he named, that he and Karen Kelly had
killed Pittman and that they were plotting to blame the killing on
McMillian." 6 Tins statement had been suppressed by the prosecution for
reasons that are all too obvious.
There was also the statement of Miles Jackson, former owner of the
cleaners where the Morrison murder was committed. Mr. Jackson had
provided the police with a statement to the effect that he had been at the
cleaners at 10:30 a.m. and that Ms. Morrison was still alive and alone at
that time. He said he could verify the time from a bank deposit slip. He had
made the deposit just before dropping by the cleaners. Apparently, Mr.
Jackson's information was not to the prosecution's liking. It conflictedwith
testimony given by Myers and with the state's theory regarding the time of
death. Investigator's notes indicated that Jackson was given a polygraph,
but no information was ever provided as to why he was given a polygraph
or what the results were.5 In addition to fins suppressed evidence, there
was the matter of the nondisclosure of records from the Taylor Hardin
Secure Medical Facility While at that facility, Myers had told four doctors
on various occasions that the police were pressuring him to testify falsely
Again, the appellate court opmed that the defendant's right to due process
had been violated by the nondisclosure of exculpatory or impeaching
information. The court was able to pay lip service to the findings of the
lower court that perjury had not been committed, while still reversing the
" SeeMcMillian, 616 So. 2d at 942-46, 948.
256 Id. at 946.
257 See id. at 947
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conviction and death sentence.38 The McMillian case is the subject of a
newly released book, CircumstantialEvidence.259
A review of these cases supports the view that the "snitch problem" is
a serious one. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
recently opined, "By definition, criminal informants are cut from untrust-
worthy cloth, and must be managed and carefully watched by the govern-
ment and the courts to prevent them from falsely accusing the innocent,
from manufacturing evidence against those under suspicion of crime, and
from lying under oath in the courtroom."' There are other interesting
aspects to the problem. If one reviews the cases with an open mind, one can
only conclude that it is extremely difficult to detect lying. There is also a
tension between lower court fact finding and appellate review A law
professor could build a whole course aroundjust a few of these cases. The
Texas case ofExparte Brandley261 proves my points. The majority opinion
is guaranteed to provoke outrage, but a strong dissent may leave you
scratching your head. Could the authorities have actually done what the
majority opinion said, or was the majority opinion a sort of lmagmative
revisionism? Here is the tale told by the majority
The opinions inBrandley came as a result of collateral review of a state
court conviction for rape and murder. In other words, there was a state
court trial (actually two in this case, the first ending in a mistrial) and a
conviction, followed by direct appellate review affirming the conviction." 2
Then, the case was reviewed on a petition for habeas corpus at the state
trial court level, followed, once again, by appellate review-conviction
overturned!263
We begin with the majority appellate opinion reviewing a lower court's
findings on a habeas corpus petition that the state investigators and the
prosecution had such a "blind focus" on the defendant that they manufac-
tured evidence against hinm. 214 According to the appellate opinion, which
more or less accepts the facts as found by Texas trial court judge Perry D.
21 See id. at 948-49.
59 EARLEY, supra note 173.26 United States v. Bernal-Obeso, 989 F.2d 331, 333 (9th Cir. 1993).
261 Exparte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en bane).
262 See Brandley v. State, 691 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
263 See Exparte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 894.
264Id. at 887 They "ignored leads to evidence inconsistent with the 'premature
conclusion that [Brandley] had committed the crime."' Id. The defense team for
O.3. Simpson made the same pitch to the jury. This is a popular and occasionally
effective theme.
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Pickett at the state habeas corpus hearing,265 Cheryl Ferguson was raped
and murdered during a girl's volleyball tournament held at the high school
in Conroe, Texas, on August 23, 1980. The girl's body was found behind
a sheet of plywood in a loft behind the stage area of the school
auditonum.26 Classes were supposed to start on August 31, and "authori-
ties announced to the public that a suspect would be arrested prior to the
commencement of classes."'267 Needless to say, this is the sort of pressure
investigators do not need if they are to get at the truth.
Enter Texas Ranger Wesley Styles, the man called upon to head up the
investigation. Styles began his investigation on August 28 and arrested
Brandley the next day without interviewing any witnesses.268 Brandley was
a janitor at the school. On Saturday, August 30, Styles called to the school
three other janitors, Acreman, Martinez, and Sessum, for what he called a
"walk through."269 During this walk through of the sequence of events on
the day of the murder, these men were questioned in each other's presence
despite the elementary rule that witnesses should be questioned
separately 270
Sessum knew something. He had seen Acreman and a former janitor
by the name of Robinson follow the girl up the stairs, after which she had
screamed, "No," and "Don't," but he was afraid of Acreman and Styles.
Acreman had threatened Sessum shortly after the murder and repeated the
threat prior to the walk through.27 Sessum had testified against Brandley
at the earlier trial, but he now stated that he had lied. Indeed, Sessum stated
265 Judge Pickett's explication of his fact finding is a bit flond. He wrote:
"The litany of events graphically described by the witnesses, some of it
chilling and shocking, leads me to the conclusion [that] the pervasive
shadow of darkness has obscured the light of fundamental decency and
human rights. I can only sadly state [that] justice has been on trial here, but
of more significance [or more accurately], injustice has been on trial."
Id. (quoting Judge Pickett's opmon).
2" See id. at 897
27 Id. at 888.
268 See id.
269 Id.
270 Remember the Biblical tale of Daniel and the Elders? The same "error"
was committed m the McMillian case, 594 So. 2d 1253 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991),
when Ralph Myers and Karen Kelly were questioned in the same room. They had
even been left alone together-a perfect setting for the fabrication of mutually
supporting stones. See EARLEY, supra note 173, at 276-77; see also supra notes
146-48.
27' See Exparte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 888.
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that he had tried to tell Styles what he knew during the walk through, but
Styles had threatened to arrest him if he did not cooperate.2' In addition to
this recantation by Sessum, Brandley offered tapes into evidence at the
habeas corpus hearing on which Acreman implicated Robinson, saying that
Robinson had "threatened him into lying about the murder." ' Acreman's
own testimony at the hearing was inconsistent and unconvincing. It also
turned out that Martinez, the third janitor who participated in the walk
through, had given several mconsistent stones. After the walk through,
Martinez's story changed to coincide with events as dictated by Styles.27 4
Styles testified that he procured written statements from the three after the
walk through, but he stated that he could not vouch for the accuracy of the
statements. Nor could he account for why Sessum's statement was signed
a month after the walk through.y
Another janitor, Henry Peace, testified against Brandley at both trials.
Peace stated that "[Brandley] repeatedly ordered [him] to search the loft
where the girl's body was, until Peace ultimately discovered the victim."2 6
At the habeas corpus hearing, he told Judge Pickett that Styles had forced
him against a wall, choked him, and then took him to the police station for
a statement. He testified that Styles threatened to blow his brains out on the
way to the station. Peace further testified that he was kept at the station
until he signed a statement. He could neither read nor write and testified
that the police would not allow a family member (apparently someone he
could trust) to read it to him.2"
In retrospect, the problem with the investigation was its "blind
focus."2 '8 When he arrived at Conroe, Styles had only one suspect:
Brandley This was so "despite the fact that a Caucasian pubic hair, not
belonging to the victim, was found near the victim's vagina. The State
resisted all efforts to obtain hair samples for comparison from the three
2f2 See id.
273 1d. at 889.
274 See id.
275See id.
2761d.
277See id. at 889-90.
27 Id. at 887 The methodology of detectives may lead to such a focus-a refusal
to look for and a tendency to discard inconvenient facts. This is the argument
advanced by COOPER & SHEPPARD, supra note 188, at 98 ("Detectives come up
with hypotheses and try to prove them."). In theory, if not always in practice, a
scientific investigator would have as much interest in disproving the hypothesis.
See Underwood, "'-Spurt" Witnesses, supra note 189, at 343.
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janitors who saw the victim before the assault." '279 The state did not test
semen found in the victim's vagina for blood type or other characteristics
even though such tests were standard procedure. Furthermore, the state did
not attempt to obtain blood samples from Acreman, Martinez, or Sessum.
There was type Ablood on the victim's shirt. The victim had type A blood,
but no wounds were found on the body Thus the blood could have been
matched to the perpetrator. Brandley was type 0. Both Acreman and
Robinson were type A, but this was not determined until long after
Brandley's conviction.80
Finally, there was the lead from a Cheryl Bradford, one of the
volleyball players. Bradford saw the victim in the hallway near the
restroom where she was apparently murdered. At the habeas hearing, she
also claimed that she saw two white men whose particulars matched
Acreman and Robinson rushing through the gym. She told her coach about
the men, and she and the coach reported this to the police. "[T]he police
'were not real interested in [her] information and were in a rush to get [her]
off the phone.""'2 ' She recontacted them, but no one ever told the defense
about her information.8 2 Brandley's conviction was reversed.3
The case of James Joseph Richardson 2s4 was almost as highly
publicized as the Randall Adams case, discussed above.8 ' Richardson was
a Florida farm worker convicted of murder in 1967 and sentenced to death
for poisoning hIs stepdaughter. She was only one of seven children, three
of whom were Richardson's natural children, who died when someone put
the insecticide parathion in their lunch-"one of the South's most ghastly
crnmes.1286
It is an understatement to say that it looks, in retrospect, as though the
Richardson case nght have been another case of "blind focus" or
investigatory tunnel vision. The babysitter and next-door neighbor Betsy
Reese was the most likely suspect. She had served the food to the children,
and during the investigation, she and another individual reportedly found
a bag ofparathion in a shed that had previously been searched by mvestiga-
279 Exparte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d at 890.
280 See id.
281Id. at 890-91.282 See id.
11 For subsequent civil litigation, see Brandley v. Keeshan, 64 F.3d 196 (5th
Cir. 1995).
14 Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1971).
's
5 See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text286 QCnden, No Honor, supra note 225, at 52.
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tors.287 She was also a suspicious character. For one thing, she had done
time for shooting her second husband to death, and her first husband
dropped dead after eating her beef stew12 1s For another, parathion has a
rather strong metallic odor. Reese should have noticed the odor when she
was dishing up the grub. The investigators remarked on the smell when
they first arrived at the locus in quo but claim that they did not question
Ms. Reese about it.2 9 Furthermore, Richardson and his wife were at work
picking fruit while the lads were chowing down."' On the other hand, there
were some bad facts against Richardson as well. First of all, he had insured
the lives of his children the night before.291 He also failed a polygraph.2'
Further, there was his stoic demeanor (jurors don't trust stoics) throughout
the ordeals of investigation and trial. This seems to have hurt hun with
investigators and with the jury 293 According to an article in the ABA
Journal, the prosecutor in the case initially felt that there was insufficient
evidence to secure a conviction,2 4 but the case became considerably
stronger after three jailhouse snitches indicated a willingness to testify that
Richardson had confessed to them while he was in the "clink."2 95 Two of
187 See id. at 53.
28 See id.
'
9 See Karl Vick, "Now I'm Free, " Richardson Says-Man Accused of Killing
Children Will Not Face New Tral, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 6, 1989, at 1A
[hereinafter Vick, "Now I'm Free'].
210 See Richardson, 247 So. 2d at 297; Cumden, No Honor, supra note 225, at
52.
291 The opinion affirmtng his conviction mentions the princely sum of $1000
per child. See Richardson, 247 So. 2d at 298. According to Curnden, an agent had
visited the home two days prior to the deaths and had talked Richardson into
insuring each child for $500, Is wife for $1000, and himself for $2000. See
Currden, No Honor, supra note 225, at 53.
292See Vick, "Now I'm Free," supra note 289, at IA.
293See Cumden, No Honor, supra note 225, at 53. One is reminded of the fate
of the stoic insurance salesman, Wallace, who was wrongly convicted of murder
in Liverpool in the 1930s. See JONATHAN GOODMAN, THE KILLING OF JULIA
WALLACE (1969).
294 See Currden, No Honor, supra note 225, at 53.
295 1 am informed that there actually was-is-a "Clink." It was a prison m
Southwark, London, and was owned by the Bishops of Winchester from the
twelfth century until 1626. In the sixteenth.century, religious "prisoners of
conscience" were kept there. The Bishops also licensed brothels, so the Clink was
in the city's red light district. The Globe theater was in the same district. All in all,
an interesting neighborhood. See EYEWITNESS TRAVEL GUIDES: LONDON 177
(1993).
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the snitches got deals m exchange for their testimony 296 The remaining
snitch, Ernell Washington, was murderedbefore Richardson's trial started,
but the judge allowed into evidence "former testimony" that he had given
at a preliminary hearing.' It has already been noted that Richardson was
convicted and sentenced to death. He was saved from execution when the
Supreme Court of the United States temporarily blocked the death penalty
in Furman v. Georga.298 His sentence became one of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole for twenty-five years.
Twenty-one years later, his conviction was vacated. The only then-
living snitch recanted. James Weaver reportedly told Richardson's lawyers
that his testimony against Richardson was "dictated to him by a deputy
sheriff who hit him 'upside the side of the head."' 299 Other
witnesses-Reese's medical caretakers-came forward to testify that Reese
had confessed to being the murderer while she was in their care. Reese is
now incapacitated by Alzheimer's disease.3° All ofthis revisiomst history
seems to have been inspired by competing TV investigative reports of A
Current Affair and Inside Edition. These stirred up enough controversy
about Richardson's twenty-one-year stay in the joint (14,000 letters of
protest from angry viewers) 30' to grab the attention of Governor Bob
296 Their testimony was crucial. See Richardson v. State, 247 So. 2d 296, 297
(Fla. 1971). Actually, they started out giving mconsistent versions of what
Richardson had said. Before trial, one snitch had said that Richardson had said that
the babysitter had killed the children. Another snitch, Weaver, had said that
Richardson had killed the children in a jealous rage because his wife had been
having a lesbian affair with the sitter. At trial, however, both pointed the finger at
Richardson. Weaver also seems to have forgotten about the affair by the time of the
trial, since he told thejury that Richardson had not said why he had committed the
crime. The defense knew nothing of these prior statements and so could not
capitalize on the inconsistencies. See Curriden, No Honor, supra note 225, at 53-
54.
297 This former testimony had not been recorded, but persons who were present
and heard it (what old-timers refer to as "bystanders," as in the old "bystanders bill
of exceptions") were allowed to testify at trial. All of this is quite proper under the
rules of evidence. See Richardson, 247 So. 2d at 299-303.
298 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
299 Karl Vick, CourtAskedto Grant "Fair Trial, " ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb.
10, 1989, at 1B [hereinafter Vick, Court Asked to Grant "Fazr Trial"].
31 See Cumden, No Honor, supra note 225, at 54.
3o1 Onthe 14,000 letters, seeNewsmagazine Shows GoFortheHeart, ORLANDO
SENTINEL TR., Aug. 26, 1991, atD4.
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Martinez, who appointed special prosecutor (now Attorney General of the
United States) Janet Reno to get to the bottom of things. °2
The course of the post-conviction fracas is hardto follow. Richardson's
lawyers argued before the Florida Supreme Court on a writ of coram
nobs, °3 claiming that the prosecution had kept evidence from the defense
and "permitted" perjury to take place, while back at the trial court Janet
Reno presented a report of her investigation to Florida trial judge, the
Honorable Clifton Kelly. In the end, it was Judge Kelly who set Richardson
free, accepting the Reno view that there was msufficient evidence against
Richardson m the first place. Reno asked some good questions, like why
Reese expressed no concern for her own children, "who were playing very
near the scene of the deaths," and why no one asked her why she had not
noticed the "potent metallic stench" of parathion.3° The State of Florida
declined to retry Richardson, but that was not the end of the story by any
means. Richardson's prosecutor, now retired, sued Richardson's lawyers
for slander.0 ' Richardson sued for $35 million for alleged violations of his
civil rights by the county sheriff and the prosecutor (who one would think
would be immune from suit).3° At last report, Richardson's civil rights
case had been settled m part, but the "details are sealed.' 30 7 Richardson
also sued a Tampa lawyer who had "persist[ed] m proclaiming that [he
was] guilty,"30" and sued his former prosecutor's defense lawyers.
Richardson later dropped the suit. The Tampa lawyer had been an expert
witness for the defense opposing Richardson's civil rights case, and he had
been highly critical of Janet Reno's handling of the matter.309 After
3 1 See Curriden, No Honor, supra note 225, at 54.
303 See Vick, CourtAsked to Grant "Fair Trial, "supra note 299, at lB. For the
opinion denying the writ, but holding that relief could be sought in the trial court,
see Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037 (Fla. 1989).31 Vick, "Now I'm Free," supra note 289, at 1A.
305 See Vick, Court Asked to Grant "Fair Trial, " supra note 299, at lB.31 See Mark Journey, Richardson to Seek $35 Million in Suit, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Aug. 3, 1989, at lB.
307 Across the USA. News from Every State-Florida, USA TODAY, Oct. 19,
1992, at 12A.308 Stephen Nohlgren, FreedMan Drops Defamation Suit Against Lawyer, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993, at 3B.
39 Former prosecutor Schaub commented about Reno in a local paper. "How
about prosecuting her for dropping the case?" Vick, "Now I'm Free," supra note
289, at 1A. Since then, Reno has gone on to bigger (if not always better) things,
and she has pretty much had the last laugh.
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Richardson's lawyers dropped this latest suit, a judge awarded attorneys'
fees to the defendants."' Is it over9
A fitting final note on the snitch problem is provided by Leslie White.
A veteran Los Angeles County jailbird who has been arrested more than
thirty times in his career, White showed authorities how he was able to get
deals from prosecutors and thereby gain Ins release. He did tius by using
the phone booth inside the county jail and wheedling information out of
district attorneys and cops by claiming to be a detective. "All you need is
a telephone and 20 cents for Ma Bell,"3 1 and you can get information
known only to "the crnmnal" and the authorities and then trade on it. Says
White, "[W]hat can they do? They can do nothing. IfI say one thing, it's
believed unless they can prove differently. The defense can't do anything.
The defense lawyerwill say, 'You're lying, aren't you?' I say, 'No, sir.' "31
The ABA Journal reported that White's disclosures to 60 Minutes forced
the L.A. District Attorney to undertake a review of 200 murder cases.
Naturally, White is now making $250 a day as an expert witness for
defense lawyers, evaluating the trustworthiness of informants. 3
White's successes in stringing along investigators is m no way unique.
In Circumstantial Evdence, which tells the story of the McMillian case,
journalist Pete Earley explains how the "snitches" work in rural Alabama.
Their modus operandi is the same as in L.A. One felon who nearly escaped
after selling one bogus story about the killing was asked how he knew facts
that the police thought only the killer would know
"I did my homework,. I read everythmg I could. If they had checked
with the prison, which I figured they wouldn't, they'd've learned that
inmates are allowed to get newspapers and watch TV while in the Hole."
He had asked several armed robbers in prison what caliber of gun they
would have used to rob a dry cleaners during a Saturday on a busy street.
"Every one of 'er said something easy to hide, like a twenty-five
caliber." How had he known Ronda was shot three times? "Most twenty-
fives carry five bullets and because them small guns ain't very accurate,
I guessed three or maybe four had hit that girl." Beating the polygraph
310 See Nohlgren, supra note 308, at 3B.
31 Curriden, No Honor, supra note 225, at 55.
312 Id.
313 See id. For the latest horror story arising from Customs and DEA reliance on
professional informants, see Mark Cumden, Informer's Lies Trigger a Tragedy,
NAT'L L.L, Mar. 6, 1995, at Al [hereinafter Currden, Informer's Lies].
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had been easy. "I lie so much, sometimes even I don't know when I'm
telling the truth. 3
14
The prevailing ethic takes it for granted that deals-the induce-
ment being dropped or lessened charges-are not prohibited. Indeed,
the infamous U.S. Sentencing Guideline, Rule 5K1.1, authorizes
federal prosecutors to recommend "downward departures" from the
mandatory minimum sentences to defendants who provide "sub-
stantial assistance" in the investigation or prosecution of others.315 A
federal judge has been quoted as saying, "'[t]alk about what has con-
tributed to an increase m witnesses making up stones and fudging
the truth, the sentencing guidelines are culprit number one."' 316 And
prosecutors are willing to go further. By 1993, payments to informants
from the federal government totaled $97 million. Worse yet, this figure
does not include the informant's cut of asset forfeitures, which can reach
twenty-five percent of the total amount forfeited.317 Are any inducements
prohibited?
The United States Supreme Court has never ruled on the abstract
question of the limits of inducement-the limits on what can be offered. In
1984, a panel of the Eighth Circuit ruled that a deal struck with a witness
amounted to a "bounty" or "contingency agreement."3 18 The witness pled
guilty in exchange for the prosecutor's recommendation that his sentence
be reduced by two years if ns "continued cooperation led to further
indictments."3 9 The defense contended that this was outright bribery, and
the panel more or less agreed. 320 The entire court reviewed the panel's
opinion en banc, however, and the judicial voting was evenly split. The net
effect was an affirmation of the lower court's rejection of the defendant's
contentions.32" ' A similar attack on contingent plea agreements in exchange
314 EARLEY, supra note 173, at 68.
315 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5Kl.1 (1995).
316 Mark Cumden, The Lies Have It, A.B.A. J., May 1995, at 68, 72.
317 See Mark Cumden, Secret Threat to Justice, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 20, 1995, at
Al.
311 United States v. Waterman, 732 F.2d 1527, 1528-29 (8th Cir. 1984).319 Id. at 1528.320 See id. at 1530-31.
321 See id. at 1533.
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for testimony succeeded in a federal trial court m Boston:3  the judge
suppressed the suspect testimony, but the First Circuit reversed.3 3
On July 1, 1998, a panel of the Tenth Circuit rocked the Justice
Department with a startling ruling regarding a prosecutor's promise of
lemency to a witness in return for testimony against a defendant m a
cocaine trafficking case.3 24 The court ruled that any such promise violates
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) and Model Rule 3.4(b). According to tis court, the
prosecutor is prohibited from buying testimony with lemency just as the
defense is prohibited from buying testimony with any other com. This is
truly a most remarkable and revolutionary holding! Pamcked Justice
Department lawyers successfully sought a review en banc.3 5 To their relief,
an en bane hearing was granted, and the court held that promises of
lemency did not violate federal law 326
There is a tantalizing irony worth alluding to at this point. One of the
original investigators in the McMillian case was Monroeville police
lieutenant Woodrow Ikner. When the case was reopened, Ikner was
31 See United States v. Dailey, 589 F Supp. 561, 564-65 (D.C. Mass. 1984),
vacated, 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1985).
31 See United States v. Dailey, 759 F.2d 192 (1st Cir. 1985); see also Neil
Eisenstadt, Note, Let's Make a Deal: A Look at United States v. Dailey and
Prosecutor-Witness Cooperation Agreements, 67 B.U. L. REV 749 (1987).
324 See United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir.), vacated and
rehearing en bancgranted, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 165 F.3d 1297
(10th Cir. 1999). Most district courts outside of the Tenth Circuit have rejected
Singleton. See, e.g., Nero v. United States, CIV A. 97-2721, CRIM. 91-321-02,
1998 WL 744031 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 1998); United States v. Nieves, No.
3:97CR238, 1998 WL 740835 (D. Conn. Oct. 13, 1998); cf United States v
Guillaume, 13 F Supp.2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (holding that, m enacting 18
U.S.C. § 20 1(c)(2), Congress clearly mtended to exclude plea agreements between
a defendant and a prosecutor). But see United States v. Lowery, 15 F Supp.2d
1348 (S.D. Fla. 1998), rev'd, 166 F.3d 1119 (1lth Cir. 1999).
325 See Singleton, 144 F.3d at 1343; see also Justice Department to Fight Ban
on Leniency For Witnesses, LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER (Lexington, Ky.), July
10, 1998, at All; Barbara Grzmcic, Not Exactly What They Bargained For-
'Influence' Case CouldLead to Tougher Laws, DAILY RECORD (Baltimore, Md.),
July 18, 1998, at 17; Patrick A. Tuite & Ronald D. Menaker, Court Slams
Testimony-For-Lemency Deals, CHI. DAILY L. BuLL., July 15, 1998, at 6; Stuart
Taylor, Jr., Sauce For the Goose, N.Y. L.J., July 13, 1998, at 2.
326 See United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1301-02 (10th Cir. 1999),
rev'g 144 F.3d 1343 (10th Cir. 1998); accordUnited States v. Ware, 161 F.3d414
(6th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 1999 WL 118760 (Mar. 29, 1999).
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forthcoming with and helpful to McMillian's new lawyer, although he
honestly believed that McMillian was guilty What he revealed was that
he had taken an entire file of witness statements. Of course, none of these
had been turned over to the defense or to McMillian's new lawyer. The
lawyer found it awkward to contact Ikner, however, because he had been
fired from the police department after being convicted of perjury for
manufacturing evidence against a black burglary suspect. Ikner informed
the lawyer that he was innocent-he had been framed by the local "powers
that be." His conviction was later reversed by the Alabama Court of
Criminal Appeals. 27
CONCLUSION
A POSTSCRIPT: THE CASE OF ROLANDO CRUz
All of the familiar themes run through the case of Rolando Cruz. In
February of 1983, a ten-year-old girl was kidnapped from her home, raped,
and murdered. The case was not "solved" by modem science. Instead, the
police followed an "anonymous tip" to an Aurora, Illinois (site of the
infamous Wayne's World), youth by the name ofAlejandro (a.k.a. "Crazy
Alex" 28) Hernandez. Hemandez was apparently excited about a reward and
pointed in the direction of Rolando Cruz, who for his part was character-
ized as a street punk.329 No physical, scientific evidence tied Cruz to the
crime but the police claimed that Cruz told them that he had had a "dream
vision" and that the dream contained details of the crime. Both Cruz and
Hernandez were convicted and given the death penalty As Cruz and
Hernandez fought for a new trial, convicted sex offender and murderer
Brian Dugan was confessing to six similar rape-murders. Indeed, he
confessedto doing the crime in question. This information was not pursued
by police or prosecutors.3 30
With the passage of time and the aid of volunteer lawyers, Cruz and
Hernandez would win new trials and then win new trials again after being
convicted a second time. The prosecution insisted on a third trial even m
327 See EARLEY, supra note 173, at 279-80. For the publishedjudicial opimon,
see Ikner v. State, 600 So. 2d 435 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).32 See Eric Zorn, In Game ofbLes, Everyone's a Loser, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 15,
1994, § 2 (Metro DuPage), at 1.329 See id., Eric Zom, Truth Be Told, Lies Condemned Cruz, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 15,
1994, § 2 (Metro DuPage), at 1 [hereinafter Zorn, Truth Be Told].330 See Protess & Warden, supra note 244.
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the face of new DNA evidence that excluded Cruz and Hernandez and
pointed m the direction ofDugan.33' At Cruz's third trial,332 a police officer
who had previously testified about the "dream statement" admitted that he
had lied m his original testimony. This caused the outraged trial judge to
direct a verdict of acquittal. This triggered a grandjury investigation of the
police and the prosecution. Prosecution witnesses who had attempted to
recant their testimony onpnor occasions,333 only to be ridiculed, now began
to be taken seriously They told tales of witness mtimidation334-they had
been forced to testify falsely by the prosecution, who threatened to indict
them for perjury and obstruction of justice if they did not toe the line.335
Defense lawyers had long contended that the "dream statement" was
a fabrication. The police had never memorialized it in any report, and it
was not presented to the grandjury that indicted Cruz, although the police
supposedly had it at the time. "liNleither the police nor prosecutors even
revealed the existence of the vision statement until two years after the
fact. ' 336 Telling was the fact that all three officers who backed each other's
stones about the statement made the same mistake. "They identified the
331 See id. Much credit for the ultimate release of Cruz and Hernandez goes to
reporter Eric Zorn, who pursued their story relentlessly.
3321 In this third trial, the prosecution was reduced to threatening to put Dugan
on the stand under a grant of immunity, eliciting Is confession, and then
attempting to disprove it! See Maurice Possley & Jeffrey Bils, Dugan May Take
Stand in Cruz Trial; Prosecutors Consider a Grant oflmmunity, CHI. TRIB., Nov
1, 1995, § 1 (DuPage Sports Final), at 1.333 See En Zom, Silence May Speak Volumes as Cruz Trial Progresses, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 26, 1995, § 2 (Metro DuPage), at 1, Witness Claims He Lied in Child-
Slaying, U.P.I., Dec. 8, 1987
11 See Eric Zorn, Recantation Lends More Ammunition for Cruz's Freedom,
CHI. TRIB., Sept 28, 1995, § 2 (Metro DuPage), at 1.
Investigators pressured [witness Pecoraro] to embellish his story by
attributing new and more vivid statements to Cruz, Pecoraro said a
DuPage County detective then threatened him with a perjury charge andjail
time that would probably cause hum to lose his business if he didn't repeat
Ins 1985 testimony at trial.
Id. The tables were turned on the detective because he interviewed Pecoraro at the
latter's pawn shop where a security camera and recorder caught the detective's
tactics on tape. See Ted Gregory, Nicarico-Case Detective Lied, Cruz Lawyers
Charge, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 1995, § 1 (North Sports Final), at 5.33 See Zorn, Truth Be Told, supra note 329.336 Terry H. Bums, Prosecutors, Police Indicted in Cruz Conspiracy, COPLEY
NEWS SERV., Dec. 12, 1996.
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day Cruz told them about the dream, May 9, 1983, as a Friday. In fact, it
was a Monday "337 Officer Montesano had testifiedm apreliminary heanng
that another officer had called him on May 9 to tell hun of the "dream
statement." At the third trial, he admitted that he had actually been m
Florida on May 9 and that he had no real recollection of being called that
day. That was when things began to fall apart.3
Indictments were issued against three (former) prosecutors and four
police (sheriffs) officers-now known as the "DuPage 7" One former
prosecutor had become a state court judge. Another had become an
Assistant United States Attorney The prosecutors were named on the
theory that they had participated m a conspiracy The indictments charged
that the officers fabricated Hernandez's vision statement and that prosecu-
tors and police conspired to conceal Dugan's confession that he had
murdered the vctim. 339 Multi-million dollar civil suits soon followed.3 40
Predictably, the new defendants-the "DuPage 7"-launched a furious attack
on the special prosecutor.3 41 Debate became bogged down m talk about
the special prosecutor's conflicts of interest and the like.342 The defense
was an offense, and the air was full of charges of prosecutorial
misconduct. 43 (Does this sound like a depressingly familiar strategy?) But
while the trial judge tossed a bone to the defense, ruling that Officer (now
Lieutenant) Montesano could not be prosecuted for perjury because he had
"recanted" his earlier testimony when he admitted the "lie" at Cruz's third
trial,344 the trial judge refused to drop the conspiracy count. Finally, on May
311 Jeffrey Bils, Cruz, Hernandez Prosecutions to Face Scrutiny; Grand Jury
Begins to Delve Into Cases, CHI. TRIB., June 27, 1996, § 2 (MetroWest), at 1.
338 See id.
339 See Bums, supra note 336.
" See William Grady & Jeffrey Bils, Nicanco SuitLooms in DuPage; Lawyer
Threatens to Go After Millions, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 1996, § 1 (DuPage Sports
Final), at 1.
34 See Ted Gregory, DuPage Judge Is Target in Cruz Case; Prominent Attor-
neys Begin a Defense Fund, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 11, 1996, § 1 (DuPage Sports Final),
atl.
342 See William Grady, Politics and Law Weave Tangled Web in Cruz Case;
County Workers, GOP Caught Up inIssues, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 1997, § 4 (Metro
DuPage), at 1.
" See Ted Gregory, Special Prosecutor in Cruz Case Draws Fire; Targeted
DuPage Officials Allege Misconduct, CHI. TRIB., June 6, 1997, § 2 (Metro
DuPage), at 1.
' See Terry H. Bums, Perjury Charge Dropped in DuPage 7 Case, COPLEY
NEWS SERV., Jan. 21,1998; ArtBarnum & Ted Gregory, Perjury ChargeDropped
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13, 1999, two of the "DuPage 7" defendants were acquitted by the trial
judge. Both were former Cruz prosecutors.3 14 The other five defendants
were acquitted as well a few weeks later-after ten and one-half hours of
deliberation by thejury 31 The prosecution of the prosecutors turned out to
be yet another trial of Cruz, whose credibility was easily shattered. The
next day, talk began to spread about a possible perjury change against
CuZ!13 47
Against Key Cruz Witness, CHI. TRM., Jan. 22, 1998, § 1 (DuPage Sports Final),
at 1, Mary Holden, Conspiracy Charges Still StandAgainst DuPage 7, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Jan. 22, 1998, at 1.
3" See Maurice Possley, Case Against DuPage 7 Starts to Shrivel Up, CHI.
TRI., May 16, 1999, § 1 (Clucagoland), at 1.
3" See Maurice Possley & Ted Gregory, DuPage 5 Win Acquittal; Jurors Join
Courtroom Celebrations After Verdicts, CHI. TRI., June 5, 1999, § 1 (Chicago-
land), at 1.
7 See Maurice Possley &Ted Gregory, Cruz CouldFace PerJury Charge, CHI.
TRIB., June 6, 1999, § 1 (Clucagoland), at 1.
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